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1 Introduction
This thesis empirically investigates deceptive behavior in social interac-
tions. It includes four experimental studies dealing with fraud, ignorance,
and lying. The aim is to better understand what drives these types of
deceptive behavior and how they are inﬂuenced by the design of the
decision-making environment. From a theoretical perspective, most of
standard economic models assume that people deceive if it is to their
own beneﬁt. People thereby weigh the beneﬁts from deception against
the potential cost of being detected and punished (e.g., Becker, 1968,
on crime). More recent models, however, assume that some people face
a sort of intrinsic costs that prevent them from engaging in deceptive
acts (Kartik, 2009, and Gibson et al., 2013). From a practical perspec-
tive, the need to better understand mechanisms that lead to deceptive
conduct is not only evident from various high-proﬁle scandals in corpo-
rations and public institutions, but also from the prevalence of dishonest
behavior in everyday life. Although media coverage typically focuses on
sensational frauds (e.g., those run by Deutsche Bank or Bernard Mad-
oﬀ), daily ordinary dishonesty is nevertheless widespread, for example,
misrepresentation about one's own performance at work or manipulating
one's annual tax declaration. One robust empirical ﬁnding reveals that
not only are a few bad apples rotten, but rather that many apples in the
barrel are just a little bit bad (Bazerman and Tenbrunsel, 2011). Taken
cumulatively, the damages from dishonest behavior for corporations and
society as a whole are considerable (Feldman, 2009). An overarching goal
of this thesis is to provide empirical insights into potentially adverse ef-
fects of established frameworks, such as corporate structures or incentives
schemes, and to propose possible solutions for organizational designers
and businesses.
This dissertation focuses on self-serving deception that results in per-
sonal proﬁts. Well-intentioned deception (e.g., about a friend's new hair-
cut), which is also an important part of social interactions, will not be
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analyzed. In the four studies presented, two basic requirements for the
possibility of deception are at hand: asymmetric information between
two parties and communication among parties (Croson, 2005). The ﬁrst
study concerns (strategic) ignorance in a bargaining environment where
the proposing party has the opportunity to deliberately remain ignorant
about the position of another party in order to selﬁshly maximize per-
sonal proﬁts. In this case, deception arises as a result of the proposer's
conscious decision not to acquire information. This omission is made
with the hope that even unfavorable oﬀers will be accepted by the other
party. The second and third studies employ two diﬀerent perspectives to
examine how personal proﬁts can be maximized through dishonesty, but
focus on direct lying about private information. In the second study, the
prevalence of lying in relation to diﬀerent performance-related incentive
schemes is examined, and in the third study the eﬀect of diﬀerent chan-
nels of communication on the individual propensity to lie is analyzed.
Finally, the fourth study addresses fraudulent behavior of sellers in a
real-world market, in which the sellers have an informational advantage
over their customers.
The scientiﬁc approach applied in this dissertation follows that of be-
havioral ethics, which is concerned with explaining individual behavior
that occurs in the context of larger social prescriptions (see Tenbrun-
sel and Smith-Crowe, 2008). In contrast to the normative philosophical
approach, which focuses on the question of how people should act, be-
havioral ethics is a descriptive facet of ethics and might be better suited
for understanding the root causes of unethical behavior (see Bazerman
and Gino, 2012). From a methodological perspective, behavioral ethics
applies experimental techniques originating from social psychology and
experimental economics. While it is particularly diﬃcult to observe un-
ethical conduct and its inﬂuencing factors in the ﬁeld, e.g., people usually
try to disguise their unethical misdeeds, an experimental technique allows
actions to be perfectly monitored. The inﬂuence of the decision-making
environment and contextual diﬀerences can be systematically varied to
better understand observed behavior. The most important advantage
of the experimental approach is control, which is essential when aiming
for causal interpretations of (unethical) behavior (see Falk and Heckman,
2009). In philosophy, experimental investigations of actual behavior have
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been rather neglected (see Knobe and Nichols, 2008, and Greene, 2012,
for exceptions).
The following paragraphs brieﬂy outline the separate research ques-
tions of each chapter and summarize the main ﬁndings and contributions.
Chapter 2 examines strategic ignorance in a bargaining context.1 It
addresses the research question of whether it pays oﬀ to remain strategi-
cally ignorant about the position of another bargaining party to achieve
the highest possible payoﬀ for oneself. The idea of introducing the option
of remaining deliberately ignorant about the position of another party -
which can either be wealthy or poor - is adapted from Dana et al. (2007).
The authors analyze the strategic use of ignorance in dictator-game giv-
ing and show that many dictators take advantage of this strategic moral
wiggle room to justify a selﬁsh actions. When transferring this approach
to a bargaining context, the proposing party has the option to remain ig-
norant about the position of the other party, with the hope that the latter
will accept even an unfavorable oﬀer. The rationale is that the accepting
party is more likely to agree to an oﬀer proposed under ignorance. This
strategy would contradict the general assumption that more information
in bargaining is always better (e.g., Fisher and Ury, 1991). In his classic
article An Essay on Bargaining, Schelling (1956) introduced the argu-
ment that ignorance might actually be a strength rather than a weakness.
We test and conﬁrm this conjecture in a simple take-it-or-leave-it ultima-
tum bargaining experiment, in which a proposer can choose between two
possible options to oﬀer. One option always gives the proposer a higher
payoﬀ than the other. The payoﬀ for the responder depends on the (ran-
domly determined) state of nature. In one state payoﬀs are aligned and
in the other they are not. Thus, an ignorant proposer who oﬀers his
preferred option does not know at the outset whether this option is also
favorable to the responder. In one treatment variation we ﬁnd that oﬀers
- even unfavorable ones - by a proposer who is by default ignorant about
the state of nature are almost always accepted by the responder. In addi-
tional treatments, we introduce the possibility of remaining intentionally
ignorant. About one quarter of proposers choose to be ignorant. Unfa-
vorable oﬀers from a proposer who deliberately chooses to be ignorant
are more frequently accepted than comparable oﬀers by a proposer who
1Chapter 2 is based upon Conrads and Irlenbusch (2013).
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informed himself. A critical feature of unfavorable oﬀers proposed under
ignorance is the proposer's intentionality. Responders seem to accept
unfavorable oﬀers proposed under ignorance because negative intentions
are less present compared to situations in which unfavorable oﬀers are
knowingly proposed (see Blount, 1995; Falk et al., 2008). In summary, we
present evidence that a proposer's informational weakness in bargaining
can be a strength, as hypothesized by Schelling (1956). In addition, we
can extent his conjecture by showing that ignorance can even be used
strategically if the other bargaining party is aware of the proposer's ig-
norance but uncertain whether the ignorance was intentionally chosen.
Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis investigate lying behavior from an or-
ganizational perspective. Lying has become a lively area of investigation
in the experimental economics literature (see Croson, 2005). It has been
demonstrated that a large share of people misreport private information
to their own material advantage. Gneezy (2005), for example, shows that
people lie more often as the personal beneﬁt from lying increases and the
loss for the deceived person decreases. In many situations, however, peo-
ple can decide whether to lie to some or the full extent. Fischbacher and
Föllmi-Heusi (2013) show that a high share of people lie `incompletely'
in order to disguise the lie and appear honest to themselves and others
(see also Mazar et al., 2008). Theoretical models try to capture these
behavioral patterns by considering heterogeneous (psychosocial) moral
costs of lying (see Kartik, 2009; Gibson et al., 2013).
A growing strand of research has demonstrated the existence of un-
ethical conduct under diﬀerent types of incentive schemes, for example,
under tournament incentives (e.g., Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2011; Con-
rads et al., 2014) or goal-setting (e.g., Schweitzer et al., 2004). Chapter
3 compares the inﬂuence of two widely-used compensation schemes, in-
dividual piece rates and team incentives, on individuals' inclination to
lie.2 Both incentive schemes evidently possess eﬀort-enhancing eﬀects
(Lazear and Gibbs, 2009). Under team incentives, revenues from pro-
ducing an output are shared among agents who build a team, whereas
under individual piece rates revenues are not shared. The manner in
which these two incentive schemes induce people to engage in lying be-
havior is a rather neglected feature of the existing literature. There
2Chapter 3 is based upon Conrads et al. (2013).
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are at least two possible explanations for the higher incidence of cheat-
ing under a team incentive scheme compared to individual piece rates.
First, gains from lying can be split among team members, which oﬀers
an easy justiﬁcation to lie. Second, lying is harder to detect since indi-
vidual responsibility is diﬀused, i.e., in most cases deceptive acts cannot
be unambiguously attributed to individuals (see Bandura et al., 1996).
Adapting the experimental die-rolling setup of Fischbacher and Föllmi-
Heusi (2013), we analyze diﬀerent treatments in which individual and
team incentives are employed. Lying turns out to be more pronounced
under team incentives than under individual piece rates. When disentan-
gling the diﬀerent explanations of lying under team incentives, we ﬁnd
that subjects tend to lie more under team incentives because they can
diﬀuse their responsibility for lying. Therefore, from a practical perspec-
tive, our study provides designers of incentive systems empirical evidence
into the potentially harmful side eﬀects of a presumably eﬀort-enhancing
team compensation scheme.
Chapter 4 focuses on piece rate compensation and investigates the ef-
fect of diﬀerent channels of communication on lying. From a practical
perspective, this question is of interest since communication has shifted
from personal direct communication, e.g., face-to-face, to more anony-
mous indirect computer-mediated communication, e.g., online. This
change in communication context may also aﬀect norms of social in-
teractions. Increasing social and physical distance of an interaction may
weaken the social norm not to lie (see Bohnet and Frey, 1999; Charness
and Gneezy, 2008). Within experimental economics literature, the in-
ﬂuence of diﬀerent communication media is analyzed in social dilemma
games (e.g., Brosig et al., 2003) and bargaining games (e.g., Valley et al.,
1998). Both studies ﬁnd higher degrees of cooperation and trust under
face-to-face pre-play communication. The study in chapter 4 systemati-
cally varies the channel of communication to analyze its pure eﬀects on
lying. By adapting an experimental coin-ﬂip game, private information
about a random production output is either communicated face-to-face,
by phone, via computer, or online. In the experimental setup, subjects
have the chance to lie either to some or the full extent to increase their
personal payoﬀs. The results suggest that the majority lies independent
of the means of communication. However, the decision whether to lie
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fully or partially strongly depends on the communication channel em-
ployed. The smaller the social distance of the communication medium
is, the less subjects lie maximally. This study therefore contributes to
other ﬁndings on incomplete lying and adds empirical evidence on the
eﬀect of diﬀerent communication channels. From a practical view, it is
important to consider which channels of communication are best suited
to speciﬁc social and business interactions, e.g., in e-business, as the use
of some channels may backﬁre in certain contexts.
In the ﬁfth chapter of this dissertation, we step out of the laboratory
and investigate fraudulent behavior in the ﬁeld (see List, 2006, for an
overview on the general advantages of ﬁeld experiments).3 The study
addresses whether and how sellers exploit their informational asymme-
tries vis-à-vis customers by defrauding them. This research is related
to the literature on credence goods markets, in which customers can-
not judge - either ex ante or ex post - whether the type or quality of
the good is the one they actually needed (see Darby and Karni, 1973;
Dulleck et al., 2011). Credence goods have been most prominently dis-
cussed in the realms of auto repair or medical services, where customers
usually suﬀer from inferior knowledge compared to expert sellers. Typ-
ically, expert sellers in these markets can either overcharge or overtreat
their customers. The market investigated in this chapter is not a typical
credence goods market but shares its essential characteristics, i.e., sell-
ers have an informational advantage over their customers that allows for
fraudulent overcharging, but not overtreatment. More precisely, we ana-
lyze behavior of sellers in urban kiosks who sell loose candy according to
candy-by-weight pricing. Some sellers secretly weigh the candy behind
the sales counter, while others weigh on a scale publicly visible to the
customer. In our ﬁrst experiment, we ﬁnd that weighing secretly leads to
signiﬁcant overcharging compared to when weighing is observable by the
customer. In our second experiment, we implement a panel in the ﬁeld
by conducting four consecutive purchases in kiosks with hidden scales to
analyze the behavioral consistency of sellers. In addition, we manipulate
the appearance of the buyer by making him appear either rich or poor,
and also varying the amount of candy bought, i.e., either a small or a
large bag of candy (the experimental design is inspired by Balafoutas
3Chapter 5 is based upon joint work with Felix Ebeling and Sebastian Lotz.
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et al., 2013). Our ﬁndings lead to the conclusion that sellers display a
behavioral consistency that enables categorization of sellers into accu-
rate or fraudulent. In addition, we show that sellers tend to discriminate
against high status buyers who purchase large quantities. The experi-
ments provide initial results on the consistency of overcharging behavior
and can therefore inform recent hypotheses surrounding credence goods
markets. As a practical solution against overcharging, we can show in
this context that transparency of prices completely mitigates the risk for
customers, as overcharging is negligible when scales are publicly visible.
In summary, the four experimental studies of this dissertation reveal
that a considerable share of people engage in deceptive behavior. How-
ever, honesty and incomplete lying can also be observed, which may un-
derline the existence of heterogeneous preferences for truthfulness. The
following four chapters present the separate research studies in detail.
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2 Strategic Ignorance in
Ultimatum Bargaining
2.1 Introduction
The availability of information on an opponent's bargaining position
plays an important role in negotiations and not only aﬀects one's own
bargaining behavior but also the behavior of an opponent. Generally, it
is assumed that the more information that is available in a bargaining sit-
uation, the better the bargaining position is (e.g., Fisher and Ury, 1991,
p.45). Schelling (1960) challenged this view by arguing that a bargainer
who is incompletely informed about his opponent's payoﬀs might have
an advantage because the opponent would be forced to make concessions
to avoid a bargaining breakdown. In his chapter on Strategic Moves,
Schelling notes, (. . . ) ignorance can be an advantage to a player if it
is recognized and taken into account by an opponent (Schelling, 1960,
p.161). As the informed bargainer is aware that the uninformed one
does not know what a reasonable solution is, the burden of avoiding a
stalemate is on the side of the informed bargainer. Early experimental
studies seem to support this view (Siegel and Fouraker, 1960; Hamner
and Harnett, 1975). The following example illustrates the basic intu-
ition: two persons walking on a crowded main street are going to collide.
One person anticipates the upcoming event but the other does not, for
example, due to a distraction. The person aware of the possible collision
clears the way, accepting the cost of leaving his ideal route. The other
(unintentionally) ignorant person continues along his intended way: be-
ing uninformed pays oﬀ. Ignorance might also be used strategically. A
person who anticipates the possibility of a collision might simply walk
down the street while looking at the ground and pretending to be igno-
rant. The other informed person has to bear the costs of avoiding the
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collision, although he might have the feeling that the ignorant person is
intentionally avoiding looking up. Thus, remaining strategically ignorant
might also pay oﬀ. Putting this in an organizational context, one might
consider a business partnership. One day an urgent request comes in,
but only one of the two partners is in the oﬃce. Sub-tasks have to be
allocated quickly between the two partners, and the nature of the tasks
prohibits subsequent re-allocation. By deliberately remaining ignorant
and not asking her partner about his preferences, the partner in the of-
ﬁce can pick her preferred sub-tasks and leave the other sub-tasks to her
partner. Should the partner turn out to dislike the sub-tasks allocated
to him, she can come up with the excuse: Oh sorry, I didn't know.
The excuse might still have some force despite the fact that, in principle,
she could have informed herself  or at least attempted to do so  for
example, by giving her partner a call.1
The aim of this study is to experimentally test Schelling's conjecture in
a simple two-person take-it-or-leave-it bargaining game. As it is partic-
ularly diﬃcult to observe (strategic) ignorance in bargaining in the ﬁeld,
we chose an experimental approach that allows actions to be perfectly
monitored, including those in which one attempts to avoid acquiring
information. Control is the most important advantage of an experimen-
tal study (see Roth, 1995; Falk and Fehr, 2003), which is essential for
our purpose, i.e., drawing conclusions regarding how strategic ignorance
causally aﬀects behavior. Moreover, in contrast to questionnaire studies,
it is possible to provide participants with incentives that are likely to
have a crucial inﬂuence on strategic ignorance in bargaining. Our basic
experimental framework comprises a simple situation that is reduced to
the essential features of strategic ignorance. One of two states of nature
is determined by a 50:50 draw. While the interests of a proposer and a
responder are aligned in state sa, they are not in state sn. The proposer
has to oﬀer one of two options, option A or option B. In state sn, the
proposer proﬁts from option A more than the responder. Option B in
1Fischbacher and Utikal (2013) analyze the eﬀectiveness of apologies in preventing
punishments after harmful oﬀenses. They ﬁnd that excuses are not accepted if the
harm-doer commits oﬀenses intentionally. If the intention of an oﬀense is not clear,
i.e., if the situation is ambiguous, apologies seem to be an eﬀective instrument to
reduce the likelihood of being punished. In our context, remaining ignorant blurs
the intentionality of the proposer and therefore might reduce the likelihood of
being punished with a rejected oﬀer.
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state sn would make both players' payoﬀs nearly equal, but this option is
slightly inferior for the proposer in comparison to option A. In state sa,
option A provides both players with higher payoﬀs than option B. The
responder can accept or reject the oﬀer. Accepting an oﬀer always leads
to positive payoﬀs for both players, while rejection leaves them with zero
payoﬀs.
In treatment Transparency, both players are fully informed about the
true state, and we observe that proposers are not always able to im-
plement their most preferred option. Oﬀers of option A are frequently
rejected in state sn. In the Non-Transparency treatment, the proposer
is ignorant about the true state, but the responder knows it. This infor-
mation is known to both players. We hypothesize that the proposer will
beneﬁt from being ignorant, as the responder will accept nearly all of-
fers. As the experimental results show, an ignorant proposer can almost
always implement her most preferred option, i.e., option A. A possible
explanation for this result is diﬀerences in causal attributions of how the
outcomes emerged. If an unfavorable oﬀer is attributable to bad luck
(i.e., the random choice of one of the two states of nature), responders
might accept these oﬀers because negative intentions are not involved
(Blount, 1995; Falk et al., 2008).
In a third treatment, Choice, the proposer can choose between remain-
ing ignorant about the state of nature or inform herself about it. None of
the alternatives incur any direct monetary costs. The notion of introduc-
ing the possibility of remaining strategically ignorant of the opponent's
payoﬀ is adapted from Dana et al. (2007), who analyze the strategic use
of ignorance in a dictator game. The dictator can remain ignorant to jus-
tify a selﬁsh action to herself. In our setting, not to inform herself about
the state also allows the proposer to select the self-interested oﬀer (i.e.,
option A) without knowing the actual payoﬀ consequences for the respon-
der. Knowing the state would potentially place some (internal) pressure
on the proposer to select the more equalizing option B in state sn. Addi-
tionally, by remaining ignorant, the proposer might wish to inﬂuence the
responder's inclination to accept option A in state sn. The responder is
always informed about the actual state and learns whether the proposer
chose to remain ignorant. We hypothesize that proposers will not beneﬁt
from strategic ignorance, as responders will perceive the act of remaining
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ignorant as hostile. Our results suggest that responders tend to reject
option A in state sn less frequently when the proposers remain ignorant.
To push the notion of the perception of hostile intentions a bit further, we
designed a modiﬁed version of the Choice treatment, Choice Uncertain
Information Acquisition, where a proposer's attempt to inform herself
about the state is only successful in 50% of the cases. As a consequence,
if the proposer remains ignorant, the responder does not know whether
this ignorance was purposeful. We ﬁnd that responders accept option
A oﬀers from ignorant proposers signiﬁcantly more frequently in state
sn than from proposers who successfully informed themselves about the
state. In a ﬁfth treatment, Choice Hidden, the responder is not informed
of whether the proposer informed herself about the state. Here, few pro-
posers remain ignorant, and responders frequently accept option A oﬀers
in state sn.
The paper is organized as follows. We begin by discussing the liter-
ature related to strategic ignorance. Second, we state our hypotheses
and elaborate our experimental design. In section ﬁve, we report the
experimental results. Finally, section six discusses the results in light of
previous ﬁndings and concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
Proctor and Schiebinger (2008, p.3) emphasize the omnipresence of igno-
rance and diﬀerentiate  from an epistemic perspective  between igno-
rance as native state (or resource), ignorance as lost realm (or selective
choice), and ignorance as a deliberately engineered and strategic play (or
active construct). In our study, we particularly focus on the third cat-
egory of ignorance. Although they assess the considerable relevance of
strategic ignorance in human interactions, the literature on strategic ig-
norance in bargaining is relatively small. Some experimental studies have
indicated that negotiators might not proﬁt from being uninformed. For
example, Roth and Murnighan (1982) showed that varying information
asymmetries between negotiators has an impact on how a pie is divided,
i.e., uninformed negotiators tend to be exploited by their informed op-
ponents. Negotiators made lower oﬀers if they knew that their opponent
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was unaware of the actual size of the pie. Being ignorant turned out to
be a disadvantage (see also Kagel et al., 1996).
Other experimental investigations have shown that ignorance might be
an advantage. Siegel and Fouraker (1960) conducted a seminal study on
the role of ignorance in bargaining. In their bilateral bargaining experi-
ment, the buyer knew the payoﬀ tables of both sides, but the seller only
knew his own payoﬀ table. The buyer and seller then had to come up
with a price-quantity agreement. Although their results were not sta-
tistically signiﬁcant, the authors found that the incompletely informed
participant tended to be better oﬀ than the informed opponent. Siegel
and Fouraker (1960) argued that the incompletely informed bargainer
established a higher aspiration level, as he was unable to form realis-
tic expectations and therefore made larger demands, smaller concessions
and accepted longer durations to reach an agreement. A follow up study
by Hamner and Harnett (1975) showed a similar eﬀect. Beisecker et al.
(1989) examined a complete-incomplete information situation with a ﬁc-
titious bargaining task. Their results show that an uninformed bargainer
can proﬁt from ignorance when the counterpart perceives the own ad-
vantage as a violation of procedural equity. To restore relational equity,
the completely informed bargainer may accept less favorable agreements.
Overall, this strand of literature suggests that ignorance in bargaining
can be an advantage. None of these studies, however, examines the pos-
sibility of strategically electing to remain ignorant.
More recently, Poulsen and Roos (2010) examined the eﬀect of strategic
information avoidance in a Nash demand game where two players had to
negotiate over the distribution of a sum of money. At the beginning, the
responder had to decide whether he wished to learn about a demand made
by a proposer. The proposer was informed about the responder's decision
before stating his demand. In a repeated setting, responders learned that
more information may be harmful, i.e., over time, information-avoidance
increased and the distribution of the surplus became more balanced. In
an ultimatum game setup, Poulsen and Tan (2007) allowed the respon-
der to choose a Minimum Acceptable Oﬀer (MAO). The proposer could
then costlessly acquire the information about the responder's MAO be-
fore making his proposal. The oﬀer was accepted or rejected according
to the previously stated MAO. One third of the proposers remained un-
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informed and oﬀered half of the pie. Information-acquiring proposers
made oﬀers equal to the responders' MAOs. In a treatment without
information-acquisition, the MAOs stated by the responders were smaller
than those in the information-acquisition treatment, demonstrating that
the opportunity to gather information about the MAOs may backﬁre for
the informed party. Thus, in these two studies, one player had the op-
portunity to remain ignorant of the other player's strategic choice. In our
study, proposers are able to remain ignorant of the payoﬀs resulting from
the oﬀer. In a similar vein, Gehrig et al. (2003, 2006) examined a situa-
tion in which a proposer could purchase information about a responder's
outside option in an ultimatum game. Under transparent information ac-
quisition, where the responder knew whether the proposer was informed,
acceptance rates were higher than in non-transparent situations.
As mentioned above, our experimental design is also inﬂuenced by the
dictator game setup of Dana et al. (2007). The aim of their study was
to analyze whether generosity in dictator game giving is truly evidence
of a concern for desirable social outcomes. They showed that when the
dictator had the opportunity to not know whether his action hurt the
receiver, many dictators chose a moral wiggle room and made self-
interested choices. Dana et al. (2007) concluded that dictators were more
concerned with seeming fair to themselves than actually being fair (see
also Dana et al., 2006; Broberg et al., 2007).
2.3 Hypotheses
Assuming that it is common knowledge that both bargainers are purely
interested in maximizing their own payoﬀs, a responder should accept any
oﬀer that gives him positive payoﬀs. Thus, a proposer could safely oﬀer
a tiny positive amount to the responder while leaving the larger share for
herself. However, as we know from numerous experiments on the ulti-
matum game and other bargaining games, proposers oﬀer more than the
smallest positive amount (see, for example, Güth et al., 1982; Camerer,
2003). This seems to be partly driven by the proposer's concerns for
(distributive) fairness.2 Partly, this behavior results from proposers an-
2Models of social preferences can explain such behavior to some extent. For promi-
nent models of inequity-aversion, see Levine (1998), Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and
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ticipating that responders are willing to reject unfair oﬀers and/or oﬀers
that signal bad intentions of the proposer (see Blount, 1995; Falk et al.,
2008).
As mentioned in the introduction (and will be explained in detail in the
next section), two states of nature are possible in our experimental game:
a state sn where interests of a proposer and a responder are in conﬂict,
and a state sa where interests are aligned. The actual state of nature
is randomly determined. The proposer has to oﬀer one of two options
to the responder, option A or option B. Option A gives greater payoﬀs
to the proposer than option B, independent of the actual state. Thus, a
self-regarding proposer should always oﬀer option A. In state sa, option
A leads to a higher payoﬀ for the responder compared to option B. In
state sn, the opposite is the case. Additionally, in state sa, option A is the
more eﬃcient (in terms of total payoﬀs) and payoﬀ equalizing option, and
in state sn, option B is the more eﬃcient and payoﬀ equalizing option.
The responder has to decide whether to accept or reject the oﬀer. If he
rejects the oﬀer, both players receive zero payoﬀs.
In our experimental design, we vary what a proposer knows about the
state of nature. In one setting, she is informed about the actual state.
In another, the proposer is kept ignorant of this. In additional settings,
the proposer can deliberately decide whether she wants to inform herself
about the state, i.e., she can also remain ignorant. The responder always
knows the actual state and whether the proposer is informed about the
state.3
In our hypotheses, we concentrate on behavior in state sn, which is
the more interesting state for the purposes of our research. In state sa,
payoﬀs are aligned and it can generally be assumed that option A will
be proposed and accepted.
In three treatments of our experimental setup, the proposer can decide
whether she wants to inform herself about the state. When unaware of
the state, the proposer naturally chooses option A because this gives her a
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). The inﬂuence of intentions is modeled in Falk et al.
(2008). Concerns for eﬃciency might also play a role in our setting (Charness
and Rabin, 2002). See also the ﬁndings on mini-ultimatum games that employ a
reduced strategy set  often two strategies  for the proposer (see, for example,
Bolton and Zwick, 1995; Güth et al., 2001; Falk et al., 2003).
3Except in treatment Choice Hidden, where the responder does not know whether
the proposer informed herself about the state (see details below).
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higher payoﬀ, it maximizes expected total surplus, and she does not know
the payoﬀ consequences for the responder. If the proposer, however, has
eﬃciency concerns, it would be desirable to know the actual state because
option A is only eﬃcient in state sa and option B is eﬃcient in state sn.
Additionally, if the actual state is sn, option A could be perceived as being
unfair, and the proposer therefore runs the risk that the oﬀer might be
rejected. Deliberately not informing oneself might also be perceived as
showing of bad intentions. However, based on the results of Dana et al.
(2007), some proposers might prefer to exploit the moral wiggle room
by remaining ignorant and proposing option A without knowing whether
this has adverse consequences for the responder. Additionally, she might
believe that it is easier for the responder to accept option A if he knows
that the proposer was ignorant of the consequences of her choice for the
responder's payoﬀ. Thus, in line with previous experimental ﬁndings,
the following hypothesis can be derived:
Hypothesis Information Acquisition of Proposers: The
majority of proposers inform themselves about the actual state.
Our second hypothesis concerns the proposer's oﬀer. Let us assume
that the proposer knows the actual state. Based on previous ﬁndings, we
hypothesize that she might be concerned about eﬃciency and/or equity
and therefore chooses option B in state sn. Additionally, in state sn,
the proposer might fear that the responder will reject option A because
this is the less equitable option. This consideration leads to our second
hypothesis:
Hypothesis Proposers' Oﬀers: Proposers who know the ac-
tual state tend to oﬀer option B in state sn. Proposers who do
not know the actual state oﬀer option A.
Our third hypothesis focuses on the responder's acceptance decision.
A responder who is primarily concerned with eﬃciency is not very likely
to reject any oﬀer because a rejection would reduce eﬃciency. Based
on previous ﬁndings on inequity aversion, we hypothesize that the re-
sponder might prefer zero payoﬀs for both players to the considerably
unequal payoﬀ allocation that would result from accepting option A in
state sn. This is true, at least if the proposer knows the actual state. If
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the proposer remained ignorant, it is unclear how the responder would
react to an oﬀer of option A in state sn. On the one hand, the responder
might be upset that the proposer did not inform herself and therefore
reject the oﬀer. On the other hand, the responder might acknowledge
that the proposer was ignorant of the consequences of oﬀering option A
and therefore accept the oﬀer (this is particularly true if the proposer
might have unsuccessfully attempted to inform herself, as could be the
case in our treatment Choice-UI ; see below). If the proposer was unable
to inform herself about the true state of nature, ignorance might serve as
an excuse, and we therefore hypothesize that in this case the responder
is inclined to accept option A in state sn. Recall that the responder al-
ways knows the actual state of nature. Thus, we arrive at the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis Responders' Acceptance Decision: Option A
oﬀers by proposers who know the actual state tend to be rejected
in state sn. Responders' reactions to option A in state sn oﬀered
by deliberately ignorant proposers are ambiguous. Option A oﬀers
in state sn by proposers who were unable to acquire information
about the actual state tend to be accepted.
2.4 Experimental Design and Procedures
2.4.1 A Simple Framework of Strategic Ignorance in
Bargaining
We consider a non-constant-sum bargaining situation in which a random
move selects one of two possible states of nature that occur with equal
probability. This is known to all players. A proposer (P) makes a take-
it-or-leave-it-oﬀer to a responder (R) by choosing between two possible
options, option A and option B. The responder has to decide whether to
accept or reject the oﬀer. Rejection leaves both players with zero payoﬀs.
Accepted options provide both players with strictly positive payoﬀs. We
focus on take-it-or-leave-it bargaining to keep the interaction simple. A
take-it-or-leave-it bargaining structure places the proposer in a position
of relative strength and places the burden of avoiding a stalemate on the
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Figure 2.1: Game trees in Transparency and Non-Transparency
Note: The ﬁgure presents the game trees employed in the Transparency treatment (when disregarding
the dotted-line information set of P) and in the Non-Transparency treatment (when including the
dotted-line information set of P). As usual, payoﬀs are denoted at the end of the tree. The number
at the top denotes the payoﬀ of the proposer, while the number at the bottom is the payoﬀ of the
responder.
responder. In a sense investigating strategic ignorance on the proposer's
side in a situation where she has already relative strength is conservative
because one could assume that she would see a stronger need to improve
her strength by remaining ignorant even more in a position of less relative
strength.
Figure 1 presents the game tree with the exact payoﬀ details. The
acceptance of option A pays more to the proposer than the acceptance
of option B, regardless of the state of nature. Whether, from the respon-
der's perspective, the acceptance of option A is more preferable than the
acceptance of option B depends on the actual state of nature. In state
sn, the responder's payoﬀ from option B is higher than that from option
A. The opposite is the case in state sa. Thus, in state sa, the payoﬀs
of the two players are aligned, i.e., option A is both players' preferred
option, while in state sn, they are not aligned.
For comparability, we essentially use the same payoﬀ parameters as
Dana et al. (2007) in their dictator game.4 When the payoﬀs are aligned
4Note that the parameters used in Dana et al. (2007) put pressure on the proposer
to inform herself because ignorantly choosing the selﬁsh option A prevents imple-
menting a (more) payoﬀ-equalizing and eﬃcient outcome in the case of state sn.
In contrast to Dana et al. (2007), we are not interested in a dictator game but
in an ultimatum bargaining setting where the proposer relies on the acceptance
decision of the responder. This puts additional pressure on the proposer to inform
herself. To balance this pressure, we provide the proposer with a potential excuse
to remain ignorant by slightly modifying the payoﬀ structure used in their game.
We reduce the option B payoﬀ of the proposer by one unit. In Dana et al. (2007),
in state sn, both players earn 5 under option B, while in our setting, the proposer
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(our state sa), option A is more eﬃcient in terms of maximizing total
surplus, while option B is more eﬃcient when the payoﬀs are not aligned
(our state sn). As in Dana et al. (2007), ex-ante, i.e., before the actual
state is known, option A maximizes total expected payoﬀs.
Our ﬁve treatments build on this baseline game. In all of our treat-
ments, the responder knows the actual state of nature when he decides
whether to accept or reject the proposed oﬀer. Treatments diﬀer with
respect to what the proposer knows or can learn about the actual state
of nature before making the oﬀer. We also vary the responder's knowl-
edge concerning what the proposer knew when making the oﬀer. In the
following, we introduce the details of our ﬁve treatments.
2.4.2 Treatments
In our ﬁrst treatment, Transparency, we employ the game depicted in
Figure 1 when disregarding the information set of the proposer indicated
by the dotted line. The proposer knows the actual state of nature when
she makes the oﬀer. Our second treatment, Non-Transparency, employs
the game that is described by the game tree in Figure 1 when includ-
ing the dotted-line information set. The proposer is unaware of the true
state of nature when making her oﬀer. Regardless of the state of nature,
however, it is beneﬁcial for the proposer to oﬀer option A, assuming that
the responder accepts the oﬀer. In the third treatment, Choice, we endo-
genize transparency, i.e., the proposer can choose between a transparent
situation and a non-transparent one. The proposer can decide to inform
herself about the actual state of nature or remain ignorant (both at no
cost) before she decides on the oﬀer. The responder accepts or rejects
the oﬀer after he learns whether the proposer informed herself about the
actual state of nature, i.e., the responder is aware of whether an option
A oﬀer in state sn was made knowingly or in the dark (the game trees of
the games employed in this and the other two treatments can be found
earns one unit less than the responder. This allows the responder to more easily
accept option A (which an ignorant proposer will oﬀer) in state sn because he
might acknowledge that the proposer cannot be expected to oﬀer an option where
she earns less than the responder. Moreover, the sacriﬁce incurred by the proposer
by proposing option B instead of option A is higher under our parametrization
than in Dana et al.'s (2007) game.
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in the appendix). Building on the game used in treatment Choice, we
relax the assumption that the responder is informed of what the proposer
knows when making the oﬀer. In the fourth treatment, Choice Uncertain
Information Acquisition (henceforth Choice-UI ), it is uncertain whether
the proposer will be successful in her attempt to inform herself about
the true state of nature. If she chooses to remain ignorant, she remains
ignorant for certain. If she chooses to inform herself, information acqui-
sition is not certain, but there is a 50% chance that it will be successful.
Otherwise, she remains ignorant. The responder is informed of whether
the proposer knew the actual state of nature when she made the oﬀer.
If the proposer knew the state, it is clear to the responder that the pro-
poser chose to inform herself and that her attempt was successful. If the
responder learns that the proposer was not informed, it might be due
to two diﬀerent reasons. First, the proposer did not want to know. Or,
second, she actually wanted to know but was not successful in informing
herself. Thus, in the latter case, the responder cannot be sure about the
actual intentions of the proposer, i.e., whether she tried to inform her-
self about the state. In our ﬁfth treatment, Choice Hidden (henceforth
Choice-H ), the responder is kept uninformed about whether the proposer
informed herself about the actual state of nature. This treatment enables
us to disentangle two motives for remaining ignorant. One motive con-
cerns self-image, i.e., wanting to be ignorant oneself (e.g., Bénabou and
Tirole, 2006). The other motive is to signal to the responder that one
is ignorant. In the treatments Choice and Choice-UI, these two motives
cannot be separated.
In all treatments, the proposer knows what the responder will or will
not learn about her chosen actions from the beginning.
2.4.3 Procedures
The experimental sessions took place at the Cologne Laboratory for Eco-
nomic Research from August 2010 to April 2011. Subjects were recruited
through the online recruiting system ORSEE programmed by Greiner
(2003). We had a total of 592 participants (289 female) who were ran-
domly drawn from a pool of over 3,000 students. Each session involved
16 to 32 participants who were not allowed to participate in more than
one session. Approximately half of the participants were economics or
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business administration majors; the other half were enrolled in diﬀerent
ﬁelds such as law and sciences. On average, participants were in their
fourth year of study. We conducted two sessions of the Transparency
(n=64), the Non-Transparency (n=64) and the Choice-H (n=64) treat-
ments. As there are more potential variations of plays in the other two
treatments, we ran six sessions of the Choice (n=190) and eight sessions
of the Choice-UI (n=210) treatments.
At the beginning of a session, participants were randomly allocated
to cubicles. After they had taken their seats, written instructions were
distributed. Within a session, all subjects received the same instructions.
The instructions for the diﬀerent treatments were identical, with the
exception of well-deﬁned passages that described the treatment variations
(see appendix).5 Each participant learned that he would play a simple
one-shot game by interacting with one other person in the room who
would be randomly and anonymously matched to him. We decided to
employ a one-shot setting to focus on behavior that is not shaped by any
type of endogenous social norm building, which could occur in a repeated
setting. Additionally, by focusing on a one-shot setting, we attempted
to avoid strategic considerations, e.g., to punish intentionally ignorant
proposers in the early rounds by rejecting their oﬀers to convince them
not to remain ignorant in subsequent rounds. Before a session began,
subjects had to complete a pen and paper quiz to conﬁrm that they had
understood the game (see appendix for the quiz).
The experiment was computerized using zTree software of Fischbacher
(2007). Participants were informed of their randomly assigned roles on
the ﬁrst screen. We neutrally labeled a proposer as participant X
and a responder as participant Y. The two states of nature were
denoted Case 1 and Case 2. In the treatments Transparency and
Non-Transparency, a proposer simply had to choose between option A or
option B. In addition, in the other three treatments, a proposer had to
decide whether to inform herself about the true state of nature. As men-
tioned above, a responder always learned about the true state of nature
before deciding whether to accept or reject the oﬀer. To collect additional
data on the responders' behavior, we solicited their decisions using a re-
5The original instructions are written in German. The instructions provided in the
appendix are translated from German into English.
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duced version of the strategy method (Selten, 1967)6, i.e., the responder
was not asked for a complete strategy but had to decide whether  given
the actual state of nature  he would be willing to accept or reject option
A and option B.
To gain deeper insights into subjects' preferences and motivations,
we asked them about their beliefs regarding the behavior of the other
player and their decisions in hypothetical situations after the subjects
had completed their decisions (and before they learned those of the other
player). The hypothetical questions concerned a situation from a diﬀer-
ent treatment or a diﬀerent state of nature. In the Transparency and
Non-Transparency treatments, we asked the proposer and the responder
to imagine that they had to decide while playing the same role but in the
other treatment. In the Choice treatments, we asked subjects to imagine
that the opposite decision had been made regarding the revelation of the
true state of nature. For example, we asked a proposer who actually de-
cided to remain ignorant which option, A or B, she would have oﬀered,
had she informed herself about the actual state. The responses to the
hypothetical questions were not incentivized.
At the end of each session, the subjects were informed of the decisions
of the other player they were matched with and their payoﬀs. They were
then were asked to complete a questionnaire on the motivations for their
decisions. Finally, the participants privately received their payoﬀs from
the game in addition to an individual participation fee of e2.50. On
average, participants earned e7.04 (including the participation fee), and
the sessions lasted for approximately 35 minutes.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Results Transparency and Non-Transparency
In the ﬁrst step, we will discuss the results from the treatments Trans-
parency and Non-Transparency. Then, we will present our ﬁndings from
the three Choice treatments in which subjects can deliberately remain
6There is no clear evidence on whether employing the strategy method leads to
diﬀerences in behavior. On this hot-or-cold debate, see for example Brandts
and Charness (2011). They ﬁnd some diﬀerences in behavior in games where the
second mover has a punishment or rejection choice.
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Table 2.1: Results from Transparency and Non-Transparency
Option A Option B
State sn State sa State sn State sa
Transparency (n=64)
Proposals 9/16 (56%) 16/16 (100%) 7/16 (44%) 0/16 (0%)
Acceptance Rates 11/16 (69%) 16/16 (100%) 16/16 (100%) 10/16 (63%)
Non-Transparency (n=64)
Proposals 30/32 (94%) 2/32 (6%)
Acceptance Rates 15/16 (94%) 16/16 (100%) 16/16 (100%) 14/16 (88%)
Note: In the treatment Non-Transparency, the 32 proposers are unaware of the actual state.
ignorant.
Table 2.1 summarizes the behavior in the Transparency and Non-
Transparency treatments. In Transparency, 9 of 16 proposers (56%)
oﬀered option A in state sn.
In state sa, all 16 proposers oﬀered option A. In response to these
proposals, 11 of 16 responders (69%) accepted option A in state sn. As
expected, the option B oﬀers were always accepted (16/16, 100%) in state
sn. In state sa, option A oﬀers were always accepted (16/16, 100%), and
option B oﬀers were accepted by 10 of 16 proposers (63%).7
In Non-Transparency, all but two of the 32 proposers oﬀered option A.
A total of 15 of 16 responders (94%) accepted option A oﬀers in state sn,
and 14 of 16 (88%) agreed to option B in state sa. The option B oﬀers
in state sn were always accepted. The same is true for option A oﬀers
in state sa. In Non-Transparency, signiﬁcantly more proposers oﬀered
option A in state sn than proposers in Transparency.
8
As hypothesized, responders reacted diﬀerently to option A oﬀers in
state sn in the two treatments. In state sn, responders accepted option A
oﬀers more frequently in Non-Transparency (94%) than in Transparency
(69%). This diﬀerence is modestly signiﬁcant.9
In the treatments Transparency and Non-Transparency, whether the
proposer was informed about the actual state was exogenously deter-
mined, i.e., intentions about remaining ignorant or not did not play a
7Note that none of the proposers actually oﬀered option B in state sa, but because
we employed a reduced version of the strategy method, responders were asked to
provide their responses to both possible oﬀers.
8With p=0.019 (Fisher-test, one-sided). This ﬁnding is also supported by OLS and
probit regressions (see Table A2.2 in the appendix).
9With p=0.086 (Fischer-test, one-sided).
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role. We now turn to the treatments where ignorance was endogenous,
i.e., could be chosen by the proposer.
2.5.2 Results Choice Treatments
A non-trivial number of proposers decided to remain ignorant in the
treatments Choice and Choice-UI. In both treatments, 24% of the pro-
posers chose not to inform themselves of the actual state of nature. In
Choice-UI, 53% of the proposers who attempted to inform themselves of
the actual state were successful in acquiring this information, while the
others remained ignorant. In Choice-H, 88% of the proposers informed
themselves of the state.
Observation Information Choices of Proposers: In
Choice and in Choice-UI, a considerable number of proposers
chose to remain ignorant. In Choice-H, few proposers did not
inform themselves of the state of nature.
Figure 2.2 displays the percentage of proposers who oﬀered option A
in state sn. The behavior in state sa - not shown in Figure 2.2 - was
very similar to the behavior in Transparency and Non-Transparency :
proposers nearly always oﬀered option A, and responders nearly always
accepted these oﬀers (see the summary Table A2.1 in the appendix).
In accordance with our hypotheses, in each of the treatments, Choice,
Choice-UI and Choice-H, very few proposers (in Choice, 3 of 35 pro-
posers, in Choice-UI, 3 of 20 proposers and in Choice-H, 3 of 14 pro-
posers) who (successfully) informed themselves of the actual state to be
sn, oﬀered option A. The vast majority of proposers who informed them-
selves oﬀered option B in this state. Proposers who remained ignorant
almost always proposed option A.
Observation Proposers' Oﬀers: In all three Choice treat-
ments, ignorant proposers proposed option A signiﬁcantly more
frequently than proposers who informed themselves of state sn.
A clear majority of proposers who learned that the state was sn
oﬀered option B.
10
10In Choice with p<0.001, in Choice-UI with p<0.001 and in Choice-H with p=0.011
23
Figure 2.2: Percentages of proposers oﬀering option A in state sn
56%
94%
9%
100%
15%
96%
21%
100%
Note: In Non-Transparency, Choice ignorant , Choice-UI ignorant and Choice-H , ignorant proposers
are unaware that they are actually in state sn; the light gray shaded bars indicate the settings in
which proposers knew the state, while the dark gray shaded ones indicate the settings in which
they did not. For reasons of completeness, we included the Choice-H ignorant, although only four
observations exist.
Proposers in the Choice treatments who chose to inform themselves
of the state of nature were in a similar situation as proposers in the
Transparency treatment when they made their oﬀers. We found that
proposers in Choice and Choice-UI who informed themselves that the
state was sn oﬀered option B signiﬁcantly more frequently than proposers
who happened to be in state sn in Transparency.
11
Figure 2.3 depicts the responders' rates of accepting option A in state
sn. In state sa - not shown in Figure 2.3 - proposers always oﬀered
option A, which was nearly always accepted by the responders. In Choice,
responders knew whether they received an oﬀer from a proposer who
informed herself of the state (Choice informed) or a proposer who chose
to remain ignorant (Choice ignorant). In state sn, 14 of 35 responders
(40%) accepted option A when it was oﬀered by a proposer who informed
(all two-sided Fisher-tests). See also the OLS and probit regressions in the ap-
pendix. There, the p-values show that compared to Transparency, a signiﬁcantly
smaller proportion of proposers who informed themselves oﬀered option A. Pro-
posers who remained ignorant oﬀered option A signiﬁcantly more often.
11With p<0.001 comparing Transparency and Choice, and p=0.014 comparing Trans-
parency and Choice-UI (Fisher-tests, two-sided).
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Figure 2.3: Percentages of responders accepting option A in state sn
69%
94%
40%
58%
40%
68%
50%
Note: The light gray shaded bars indicate the settings in which proposers knew the state, the
dark gray shaded ones indicate the settings in which they did not (except for Choice-H , where
most proposers informed themselves of the state but responders were not informed of the proposers'
decision of whether to inform themselves).
herself. In comparison, if option A was oﬀered by ignorant proposers,
these oﬀers were accepted more frequently, i.e., by 7 of 12 responders
(58%). Therefore, option A oﬀers in state sn from ignorant proposers
seemed to be regarded as more acceptable than those from proposers
who informed themselves of the state.
Responders in Choice-UI knew when a proposer successfully informed
herself of the state of nature. In Choice-UI, 8 of 20 responders (40%)
accepted option A when it was oﬀered by proposers who successfully
informed themselves that the state was sn. If proposers in Choice-UI
remained ignorant, responders did not know whether the proposers' ig-
norance was intentional or whether they unsuccessfully attempted to in-
form themselves of the state. We found that 21 of 31 responders (68%)
accepted option A when it was oﬀered by ignorant proposers. The dif-
ference in the acceptance rates for option A between proposers who in-
formed themselves about the state and proposers who remained ignorant
is signiﬁcant.12
Thus, option A oﬀers in state sn oﬀered by ignorant proposers were
12With p=0.051 (χ2-tests, two-sided).
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accepted slightly more frequently in Choice-UI than in Choice (the dif-
ference is not signiﬁcant). Option A oﬀers in Choice and Choice-UI after
deliberately informing oneself about the state sn were disliked more by
the responders than oﬀering the option A in state sn in Transparency.
13
In Choice-H, the responder was not informed whether the proposer
informed herself of the state of nature. In this treatment, the accep-
tance rate for option A in state sn was between those of Choice informed
and Choice ignorant, as 8 of 16 responders (50%) accepted this oﬀer.
The same is true when comparing the acceptance rates of Choice-H and
Choice-UI.
Observation Responders' Acceptance Decisions: In
Choice in state sn, option A oﬀers were accepted with a slightly
higher frequency (although the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant) when
they were oﬀered by ignorant proposers than by proposers who in-
formed themselves of the state. The corresponding comparison is
signiﬁcant in Choice-UI. In Choice-H, the acceptance rate of op-
tion A oﬀers in sn was between those of Choice informed and
Choice ignorant.
2.5.3 Proposer Payoﬀs
A crucial question is whether it pays for the proposer to be (strategi-
cally) ignorant. As we elicited responders' acceptance behavior for both
possible options in the actual experiment, the expected payoﬀs (hence-
forth EP) of diﬀerent proposers' strategies can be calculated.14 Table 2.2
13With p=0.042 (χ2-tests, two-sided, pooled data from Choice and Choice-UI ). See
also the OLS and probit regressions in Table A2.2 in the appendix. The p-values
show that compared to Transparency, a signiﬁcantly smaller share of responders
accepted option A oﬀers by proposers who informed themselves that the state was
sn.
14Under the matching strategy in our experiment, proposers who are kept ignorant
in the Non-Transparency treatment earn signiﬁcantly more than in the Trans-
parency treatment, independent of the actual state (p=0.016, Mann-Whitney-
U-test, henceforth: MWU, two-sided). In Transparency, proposers earn e5.19
on average compared to e5.69 in Non-Transparency. In the Choice treatment,
there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the payoﬀs earned by informed and ig-
norant proposers (p=0.158, MWU, two-sided). However, with ambiguity about
the proposer's intentions in Choice-UI, ignorant proposers earn signiﬁcantly more
than proposers who successfully informed themselves that the state was sn or sa
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Table 2.2: Expected payoﬀs (EP) and observed total surplus
EP (option A) EP (option B) Observed total surplus
State sn State sa State sn State sa
Transparency 3.36 6 4 2.52 8.37
Non-Transparency 5.82 3.76 8.66
Choice informed 2.4 6 4 1.9 9.65
Choice ignorant 4.74 2.98 7.38
Choice-UI informed 2.4 5.7 4 2.52 8.65
Choice-UI ignorant 5.04 3.26 8
Choice-H informed 3 6 4 3 9.53
Choice-H ignorant 4.5 3.5 9
Notes: Expected payoﬀs (EP) for the proposers and observed total surplus for proposers and re-
sponders are displayed in Euros. The expected payoﬀs for the proposers are based on the observed
responders' acceptance rates.
summarizes these EP for all possible proposer actions. Thus, in treat-
ment Transparency under state sn, it is beneﬁcial for the proposer  in
expected payoﬀ terms  to oﬀer option B, and in the case of state sa,
proposing option A is beneﬁcial. In treatment Non-Transparency, where
the proposer does not know the actual state, the expected payoﬀ from of-
fering option A is higher than that of oﬀering option B. The best strategy
for a self-regarding proposer who informs herself of the state in the three
Choice treatments is to propose option B in the case of state sn and op-
tion A in the case of state sa. For a proposer who remains ignorant, the
EP are always higher when oﬀering option A than when oﬀering option
B. The EP of a proposer who informs herself in the treatment Choice and
Choice-H are higher compared to a proposer who remains ignorant.15
In treatment Choice-UI, however, the expected payoﬀ of a proposer
who remains ignorant is slightly higher than that of a proposer who in-
forms herself of the state. In addition, Table 2.2 also provides the actually
observed total surplus for each treatment and information acquisition de-
cision. In the treatments Transparency and Non-Transparency, the total
surplus is nearly identical. In the three Choice treatments, however, the
(p=0.045, MWU, two-sided). Remaining strategically ignorant in this treatment
pays oﬀ, as proposers who inform themselves of the state earn e4.83 on average
and ignorant proposers on average make e5.20.
15For example, in treatment Choice, the ex-ante expected payoﬀ of a proposer who
informs herself and optimally reacts to the observed responders' strategies would
be e5 (in state sn, she would choose option B, and in state sa, she would choose
option A), and the payoﬀ would be e4.74 for a proposer who remains ignorant.
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total surplus is always higher in situations where the proposers decided
to inform themselves of the state than in situations where the proposer
remained ignorant. Thus, more eﬃcient outcomes are achieved when
proposers inform themselves of the state.
2.5.4 Hypothetical Decisions and Beliefs in Choice
We asked ignorant proposers in Choice what they would hypothetically
have done had they informed themselves of the state of nature. A total
of 12 of the 23 ignorant proposers (52%) would have oﬀered option A in
state sn. However, only 3 of the 35 proposers (9%) who actually informed
themselves that the state was sn oﬀered option A. A potential explana-
tion might be that proposers who informed themselves of the state of
nature were more fairness-oriented than proposers who chose ignorance.
It might be that the more fair-minded participants sorted into informing
themselves (for a theoretical analysis related to this observation, see for
example Grossman and van der Weele, 2013).
We also asked proposers who informed themselves of the state of na-
ture whether they believed that option A in state sn would have been
accepted if oﬀered by a proposer who informed herself. A total of 14 of the
71 proposers (20%) believed that such oﬀers would have been accepted.
The same proposers were also asked about their beliefs concerning the
acceptance of an option A oﬀer in state sn if a proposer had chosen ig-
norance. Here, 26 of the 71 proposers (37%) who informed themselves
believed that these oﬀers would have been accepted. Posing the same
questions to proposers who did not inform themselves of the state in-
dicates that 10 of 23 (43%) believed that an option A oﬀer in state sn
would have been accepted if the proposer had informed herself of the
state of nature. Without informing themselves, 19 out of 23 (82%) igno-
rant proposers believed that such an oﬀer would have been accepted.16
Thus, the proposers' beliefs seemed to reﬂect their diﬀerent perceptions
of the eﬀectiveness of ignorance as a potential strategic advantage.17
16The diﬀerences in the beliefs of ignorant proposers and proposers who informed
themselves concerning the eﬀect of ignorance is signiﬁcant (p=0.027, MWU).
17Asking participants to brieﬂy explain the motivations behind their decisions gener-
ated interesting insights. A proposer who decided to inform herself of the state, for
example, wrote (translated from German): I informed myself of the state because
I wanted to oﬀer option B in the case of state sn. If I really wanted to oﬀer option
A in this state, I would not have informed myself of the state to positively inﬂuence
28
Examining the responders' hypothetical decisions in the Choice treat-
ment in greater detail sheds some light on the role of the proposers'
intentions. Only 14 of the 35 responders (40%) actually accepted option
A oﬀers in state sn oﬀered by a proposer who informed herself. However,
21 of these 35 responders (60%) would have hypothetically accepted such
oﬀers if the proposers had remained ignorant.18 Moreover, 7 of 12 respon-
ders (58%) accepted option A oﬀers in state sn when they were oﬀered
by ignorant proposers. Only 4 of these 12 responders (33%), however,
would have accepted such oﬀers if they had been made by a proposer
who informed herself of the state and found the state to be sn.
19
2.6 Concluding Remarks
The results from the Transparency and Non-Transparency treatments
provide support for Schelling's conjecture: ignorance can indeed be an
advantage for proposers. Nearly all uninformed proposers in the Non-
Transparency treatment obtain their maximum payoﬀ, i.e., e6. Respon-
ders seem to acknowledge that their opponents do not know the respon-
ders' payoﬀ structure. The high rate of acceptance may be due to the
responders' tendency to attribute the negative consequences of option
A oﬀers in state sn to the randomly occurring state of nature. Thus, a
selﬁsh intention on the part of the proposer might be diluted.
In the three Choice treatments, there are at least two possible reasons
the responder to accept option A. Another proposer, who did not inform herself
of the state of nature, commented: I did not inform myself of the state to have
an excuse for oﬀering option A in state sn. In my opinion, the responder then
does not think that I am intentionally mean. A responder who received an oﬀer
from a proposer who learned the state wrote: I accepted option B in state sn, as
it is the fair solution for both players. But I did not accept option A because I
don't want to accept e6 for him and only e1 for me. I decided this way because I
knew that the proposer informed herself of the state. In case the proposer would
not have informed herself, I would have accepted all oﬀers because then chance
would have decided and the proposer would not have known what state actually
occurred.
18Asking this question to all responders who received an oﬀer from a proposer who
informed herself regardless of whether they were in state sn or state sa showed
that 38 of 71 responders (53%) would have accepted option A in state sn from an
ignorant proposer.
19Asking this question to all responders who received an oﬀer from an ignorant pro-
poser regardless of whether they were in state sn or state sa showed that only 8
of 23 responders (35%) would have accepted option A from a proposer who was
aware that the state was sn.
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for a proposer to remain ignorant. The ﬁrst is that a proposer wants
to remain ignorant to herself, i.e., she does not want to know what a
given oﬀer means for a responder. A proposer who wants to oﬀer option
A may feel more morally consistent when ignorant compared to knowing
the state, as the random draw could be blamed for an outcome that is po-
tentially unfavorable for the responder (see Dana et al., 2007). However,
our observations from treatment Choice-H indicate that this explana-
tion seems to have limited force: when responders are not informed of
the proposer's decision of whether to acquire information, very few pro-
posers remain ignorant (to themselves). A second reason for remaining
ignorant might be that a proposer strategically uses ignorance. Such a
proposer may believe that ignorance increases the responder's inclina-
tion to accept option A oﬀers in state sn. This second explanation is
supported by the observed proposers' beliefs and responses to our open
questions: proposers who deliberately remained ignorant believed that
option A in state sn would be less frequently accepted if they had in-
formed themselves of the state.
There are, however, at least two reasons for the proposers to inform
themselves of the state of nature. The ﬁrst is that a proposer might
propose option A in state sn when she remains ignorant, which could
lead to the responder's rejection. Second, if a proposer has genuine pro-
social preferences, she wants to acquire information about the true state
of nature to oﬀer option B in state sn that gives the responder a higher
payoﬀ and is also more equal and eﬃcient. This second explanation is
supported by the ﬁnding that proposers who inform themselves of the
state in the Choice treatments more frequently oﬀer option B in state
sn than proposers in Transparency. Additionally, the hypothetical deci-
sions also indicate that genuine pro-social proposers sort into informing
themselves, whereas ignorant proposers attempt to strategically exploit
the moral wiggle room.
At ﬁrst sight, one might imagine that an option A oﬀer in state sn
is evaluated similarly by a responder regardless of whether a proposer
informed herself or deliberately remained ignorant. As it is costless to
inform oneself of the state, it could, however, be argued that remain-
ing intentionally ignorant is a more ruthless behavior on the part of the
proposer. The acceptance rates show that responders tend to accept
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option A oﬀers in state sn more frequently when they come from ig-
norant proposers than from proposers who informed themselves. This
diﬀerence is even signiﬁcant in Choice-UI, where responders could not
be certain whether this ignorance was intended by the proposer. There-
fore, Schelling's conjecture (1960) that informational weakness can be
a strength is supported (by the comparison of Transparency and Non-
Transparency) but might also be extended: ignorance can even be used
strategically if the opponent is aware of the ignorance but is uncertain
whether the ignorance was intentional (shown in Choice-UI ). Moreover,
option A oﬀers in state sn from proposers who inform themselves of the
state are more frequently rejected in each of the Choice treatments than
in the Transparency treatment. Responders seem to perceive option A
oﬀers by proposers who deliberately informed themselves that the state
was sn (in the Choice treatments) as having worse intentions than pro-
posers who oﬀered option A and were immediately provided with the
information that the state was sn (in the Transparency treatment).
In light of our results, insuﬃcient attention has been devoted to re-
search on the strategic use of ignorance in bargaining. We are aware
that our experiment uses a speciﬁc bargaining format and a speciﬁc pay-
oﬀ structure. Further research is needed to verify whether our ﬁndings
extend to richer bargaining formats that go beyond take-it-or-leave-it
bargaining, for example, sequential oﬀer bargaining. In such a situation,
the bargaining power is more equally divided between the two players,
and therefore one could expect that a proposer has a greater need to
strengthen her position, for example, by exploiting strategic ignorance.
As we have a situation characterized by asymmetric information where
the responder knows the state of nature but the proposer does not, se-
quential oﬀer bargaining could involve signaling on the side of the respon-
der, which makes the strategic interaction more complex. Bargaining
settings are often of a repeated nature, and one might wonder whether
parties adapt their behavior over time. Thus, it would also be interesting
to study learning and endogenous social norm building in repeated set-
tings. Because remaining ignorant might be perceived as rude behavior,
it is an open question as to whether strategic ignorance will be used less
frequently in a face-to-face environment.
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2.7 Appendix
Figure A2.1: Game-tree of the Choice treatment
Figure A2.2: Game-tree of the Choice Uncertain Information Acquisition
(Choice-UI ) treatment
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Figure A2.3: Game-tree of the Choice Hidden (Choice-H ) treatment
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Table A2.2: OLS and probit regressions on decisions in state sn
(1) OLS (2) Probit (3) OLS (4) Probit
Dependent variable: oﬀer_A oﬀer_A accept_A accept_A
Non-Transparency 0.375*** 0.470*** 0.249 0.320**
(0.118) (0.134) (0.155) (0.126)
Choice_i -0.477*** -0.510*** -0.288** -0.301**
(0.101) (0.104) (0.129) (0.134)
Choice_ni 0.437*** dropped -0.105 -0.123
(0.127) (0.169) (0.184)
Choice-UI_i -0.413*** -0.401*** -0.289** -0.310**
(0.112) (0.114) (0.116) (0.123)
Choice-UI_i_ns 0.326*** 0.389***
(0.115) (0.148)
Choice-UI_ni 0.361*** 0.439*** 0.157 0.164
(0.124) (0.146) (0.115) (0.112)
Choice-H_i -0.348*** -0.330**
(0.122) (0.134)
Choice-H_ni 0.437* dropped
(0.250)
Choice-H -0.188 -0.206
(0.155) (0.165)
Constant 0.563*** 0.688***
(0.0833) (0.101)
Observations 146 132 146 146
R-squared 0.583 0.141
pseudo R-squared 0.446 0.117
Note: Model (1) and (2) explain the eﬀects of the diﬀerent treatment situations on the proposer's
decision to oﬀer option A (oﬀer_A). Model (3) and (4) explain the eﬀect of the diﬀerent treatment
situations on the responder's decision to accept option A (accept_A). Reference category is the
Transparency treatment. Independent variables are dummies for diﬀerent treatment situations.
Choice_i stands for the Choice treatment in which a proposer informed herself to be in state sn and
Choice_ni stands for a situation in which a proposer did not inform herself about the state. The
same applies for the treatments Choice-UI and Choice-H . Choice-UI_i_ns stands for a situation,
in which a proposer tried to inform herself about the state but was not successful, i.e., she remained
uninformed about the state. Choice-H means a situation where a responder does not know if a
proposer informed herself about the state or not. Standard errors are in parentheses. Levels of
signiﬁcance are indicated as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Instructions of the Experiment (translated from German)
{[Transparency, Non-Transparency, Choice, Choice-UI, Choice-H ]
Instructions
Welcome and thank for your participation in today's experiment. Please
read these instructions carefully. If you have any questions, do not hesi-
tate to raise your hand, we will help you personally.
In this experiment you can earn money. The amount of money you will
earn depends on both, your own decisions and the decisions taken by
another participant. At the end of the experiment you will receive your
payoﬀ in cash. Your payoﬀ is composed out of the experiment's payoﬀ
and a show-up fee of e 2.50. You will receive the participation show-up
fee independently from the payoﬀs you gain during the experiment. From
now on, we kindly asked you stop all communication. Please make sure
that your cell phone is switched oﬀ. A violation against these rules may
lead to the exclusion from this and other experiments.
The Basic Decision Situation
In the decision situation there are two types of participants, participant
X and participant Y, and two possible cases, case 1 and case 2. The
payoﬀ-tables for both participants are as follows:
Option A X: 6 e Y: 1e Option A X: 6 e Y: 5e
Option B X: 4 e X: 5e Option B X: 4 e X: 1e
Case 1 Case 2
One of the two cases will randomly appear. Case 1 and case 2 occur
with equal probability. Within each case, two Options exist, Option A
and Option B. Participant X chooses one of the two Options. With each
respective Option, diﬀerent payoﬀs for participant X and participant Y
are associated. Independently from the occurring case, Option A leads to
a payoﬀ of e 6 and Option B to e 4 for participant X. For participant Y
diﬀerent payoﬀs are associated with the diﬀerent Options in the diﬀerent
cases. In case of case 1, Option A would lead to a payoﬀ of e 1 and
Option B to a payoﬀ of e 5. In the event of case 2, Option A would lead
to a payoﬀ of e 5 and Option B to a payoﬀ of e 1. Participant Y is able
to accept or to reject the Option proposed by participant X. If participant
Y accepts the Option chosen by participant X, both participants receive
the respective payoﬀs. If participants Y rejects the Option chosen by
participant X, both participants receive zero payoﬀs.
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The Decision Situation in Detail
At the beginning of the experiment you will be informed via the computer
screen which of the two possible roles  either participant X or participant
Y  will be randomly assigned to you. At the same time and again
randomly you will be assigned to another participant you will interact
with. This assignment is completely anonymous. In each composed pair,
one participant has the role of participant X and the other has the role of
participant Y. The interaction within each pair only occurs through the
computers. After you are informed about your role, you can continue by
pressing an OK-Button.}
{[Transparency ] Participant X takes the ﬁrst decision. He is informed
which of the two possible cases  case 1 or case 2  has occurred. Thus,
he sees one of the two following payoﬀ-tables:}
{[Choice, Choice-UI, Choice-H ] Participant X takes the ﬁrst decisions.
At the beginning he sees the following buttons. He chooses between the
two buttons by pressing one of them:
Inform yourself Do not inform yourself
about participant Y's payoﬀ about participant Y's payoﬀ
Participant X has two possibilities: He can {[Choice-UI : try to]} inform
herself about participant Y's possible payoﬀs or he cannot inform her-
self, respectively. If participant X decides for pressing the button Inform
yourself about participant Y's payoﬀ he sees {[Choice-UI : with a prob-
ability of 50%]} one of the two possible payoﬀ-tables:
Option A X: 6 e Y: 1e Option A X: 6 e Y: 5e
Option B X: 4 e X: 5e Option B X: 4 e X: 1e
Case 1 Case 2
Speciﬁcally, through pressing the button Inform yourself about partic-
ipant Y's payoﬀ, participant X is informed {[Choice-UI: with a proba-
bility of 50%]} which of the two possible cases  case 1 or case 2  has
occurred. {[Choice-UI : With a probability of 50% participant X does not
learn which case has occurred although he pressed the Button Inform
yourself about participant Y's payoﬀ. In this case the attempt to inform
herself about participant Y's payoﬀ was not successful and participant X
only sees the following table:
Option A X: 6 e Y: ? e
Option B X: 4 e X: ? e
Case 1 or case 2
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Here participant X does not know which of the two possible cases has
occurred. Instead of participant Y's possible payoﬀs only a ? is vis-
ible.]} {[Transparency, Choice, Choice-UI, Choice-H ] Now, participant
X chooses between Option A and Option B. Note that the payoﬀs for
participant X associated with the two cases are identical with respect to
the Options. This means participant X always receives e 6 for Option A
and e 4 for Option B provided participant Y accepts the chosen Option.
For participant Y the payoﬀs in both cases are diﬀerently.}
{[Non-Transparency ] Participant X takes the ﬁrst decision. He is not in-
formed which of the two possible cases  case 1 or case 2  have occurred.
Thus, he sees the two following payoﬀ-table:]}
{[Choice, Choice-UI, Choice-H ] If participant X decides for pressing the
button Do not inform yourself about participant Y's payoﬀ he sees the
following payoﬀ-table:
Option A X: 6 e Y: ? e
Option B X: 4 e X: ? e
Case 1 or case 2
Participant X then decides not to know the possible payoﬀs for partici-
pant Y.} {[Non-Transparency, Choice, Choice-UI, Choice-H ] Speciﬁcally
he is not informed if case 1 or case 2 occurred. Instead of participant Y's
possible payoﬀs only a ? is visible. But participant X knows that he
receives a payoﬀ of e6 for Option A and a payoﬀ of e4 for Option B if
participant Y accepts his decision. Participant X then chooses between
Option A and Option B.}
{[Transparency, Non-Transparency, Choice, Choice-UI, Choice-H ] Par-
ticipant Y will be informed which of the cases  case 1 or case 2  have
occurred.} [{Choice] At the same time he is {[Choice-H ] not} informed if
participant X informed herself about participant Y's possible payoﬀs or if
he covered it. Thus, he will be {[Choice-H ] not} informed if participant
X knew the possible payoﬀs for participant Y associated with the Option
chosen. {[Choice-UI ] If participant X was uninformed about participant
Y's payoﬀ this can be due to two reasons: either participant was not
successful in informing herself about participant Y's possible payoﬀs or
participant X decided not to inform herself about participant Y's possi-
ble payoﬀs. If participant X was uninformed participant Y will not be
informed due to which reason participant X became uninformed.}
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{[Transparency, Non-Transparency, Choice, Choice-UI, Choice-H ] Par-
ticipant Y now decides for both possible Options of participant X  so for
Option A and Option B  if he accepts or rejects participant X's choice.
Depending on the Option actually chosen by participant X, payoﬀs for
both participants are determined. If participant Y accepts the Option
chosen by participant X, both participants receive their respective pay-
oﬀs. If participant Y rejects the Option chosen, both participants receive
zero payoﬀs.}
{} = Indicate the phrase that is exclusively employed in the respective
treatment, [Transparency ], [Non-Transparency ], [Choice], [Choice-UI ] or
[Choice-H ].
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3 Lying and Team Incentives
3.1 Introduction
Deception and lying is common in all kinds of social interaction (Bok,
1999; Feldman, 2009) and recently, this topic also raised considerable in-
terest in the experimental economics literature (Croson, 2005). In a sim-
ple and innovative die-rolling game Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013),
henceforth F&H, for example, ﬁnd that people systematically over-report
the true value of a private die-roll when the reported number determines
their individual pay. Interestingly, people seem not to exaggerate their
claims to the full extent what the authors call `incomplete lying'. This
result is in line with the idea of `self-concept maintenance' investigated
by Mazar et al. (2008). They argue that lying to a small extent does
not necessarily require changing one's self-image as an honest person.
Gneezy (2005) investigates the role of consequences on the inclination of
lying and ﬁnds that people deceive more often the higher the own proﬁt
from lying and the lower the loss for the deceived person (for an exten-
sion see Sutter, 2009). Schweitzer and Hsee (2002) point out that people
tend to justify lying more easily when other people beneﬁt from dishon-
est behavior. Following this argument, Wiltermuth (2011) shows that
people are more likely to cheat when the beneﬁts of doing so are split
with another person even if this other person is totally unknown to the
cheater. In a similar vain, Mazar and Aggarwal (2011) demonstrate that
individuals who are primed in a collectivist mindset more frequently be-
have unethical, i.e., oﬀering bribes, as they feel less responsible for their
own actions. Thus, deceit also seems to be psychologically easier because
of diﬀusion and displacement of responsibility, i.e., the likelihood to de-
ceive increases when individual causal agency for unethical behavior is
obscured (Bandura, 1991; Bandura et al., 1996).
In this paper we take an organizational perspective and look at the in-
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ﬂuence of diﬀerent compensation schemes on deceptive behavior and ly-
ing. Such a perspective is also taken by Cadsby et al. (2010) who employ
an anagram task and experimentally analyze the diﬀerences in cheat-
ing under piece-rate, target-based and tournament incentive schemes.
They ﬁnd that lying in terms of over-claimed words is most pronounced
under the target-based system as targets seem to encourage people to
lie particularly if one is close to the target. By following up on their
work, in the current study we compare lying behavior under the two
probably most commonly observed incentive schemes in organizations,
i.e., individual piece-rate compensation and team compensation schemes
(Gibbons, 1998; Lazear and Gibbs, 2009). Ledford et al. (1995), for ex-
ample, show that more than 70% of major US ﬁrms use some form of
team-based rewards. Using data of a representative survey of German
companies Berger et al. (2010) ﬁnd that performance-related pay such
as piece-rate compensation and team-based variable compensation are
widespread. This suggests that the investigation of potential deceptive
behavior under these two compensation schemes is important.
We use a variant of the die-rolling game of F&H, which in their version
resembles an individual piece-rate compensation scheme. We are able to
conﬁrm F&H's ﬁndings, i.e., people systematically lie but quite often
they are reluctant to do so to the full extent. Our team compensation
scheme is modeled as a revenue sharing mechanism (for an earlier ex-
perimental study on revenue sharing see Nalbantian and Schotter, 1997).
The production outputs of two agents are pooled and each agent receives
one half of a compensation unit for each unit of the joint production
output. Comparing the marginal incentives to lie under the two schemes
reveals that under the team compensation scheme the marginal gain from
lying, i.e., the return from exaggerating the own production output by
one unit, is only half of the marginal gain from lying under the individ-
ual piece-rate scheme. Assuming increasing marginal costs of lying this
could lead one to assume that lying should be more pronounced under
the individual piece-rate scheme than under the team incentive scheme.
On the other hand, in the team incentive scheme lying is not exclusively
beneﬁcial for oneself - as it is the case under the individual compensation
scheme - but it also beneﬁts the other agent in the team. Thus, an agent
under a team incentive scheme might be more able to justify such a white
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lie to herself compared to a lie under the individual scheme - after all she
is doing something `good' for the other team member (see Wiltermuth,
2011). Moreover, lying under the team incentive scheme might be psy-
chologically easier because this compensation scheme promotes diﬀusion
of one's own responsibility, i.e., tracing lies back to individual team mem-
bers is more diﬃcult under team compensation compared to individual
compensation.
Extending upon our two main experimental treatments we addition-
ally run a control treatment in order to explore potential motives of lying
behavior under the two compensation schemes. Disentangling diﬀerent
motives behind deceptive actions would shed some light on the eﬀective-
ness of intra-organizational arrangements to reduce lying behavior when
distinct compensation incentives are present.
The discussed lines of reasoning point into diﬀerent directions whether
lying is more severe under an individual than a team incentive scheme.
Our experimental results suggest that lying is in fact more pronounced
under the team incentives than under the individual piece-rate scheme.
We also ﬁnd diﬀusion of responsibility to be a stronger driving force for
lying in teams than the white lie justiﬁcation.
3.2 Experiment
Our experiment employed a simple one shot decision task closely resem-
bling the baseline treatment of F&H. We ran two waves of experimental
sessions. The ﬁrst wave included our two main experimental treatments.
Within each session we randomly assigned subjects either to the piece-
rate or the team based compensation scheme. The second wave consisted
of a control treatment designed to investigate potential motives of lying
behavior under each of the above compensation schemes. Due to the
short nature of the task we followed the procedure of F&H in conducting
the experiment after several diﬀerent other experiments. Experimental
sessions were run in the laboratories of Bonn University and the Univer-
sity of Cologne between August 2010 and August 2012 and involved 554
subjects (with a mean age of 24.55 and 51% being female).
At the end of each experiment we asked subjects to ﬁll in a question-
naire for a statistical survey for which they would be rewarded indepen-
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dently of the preceding experiment. The questionnaire contained ques-
tions about gender, age, and personality measured by a 10-item Big-Five
inventory covering the traits Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion,
Agreeableness and Neuroticism (Rammstedt and John, 2007).1 A sepa-
rate instruction sheet explained that their pay would be based on `points'
pi that were randomly determined, i.e., by rolling a standard 6-sided die.
By introducing points that were interpreted as `random production out-
put' we slightly adapted the setting of F&H. The reason was that we
were particularly interested in investigating lying under diﬀerent com-
pensation schemes.
In our two main experimental treatments it was explained to the sub-
jects that the points pi of subject i resulted from the number di shown on
the die, i.e., pi = di, if di ∈ {1, ..., 5}. If a 6 was diced (di = 6), no points
were earned (pi = 0). Subjects were randomly assigned to the two treat-
ments that diﬀered in the way points, i.e., random production outputs,
were translated into payoﬀs pii. The ﬁrst main experimental treatment
Individual closely resembled the baseline treatment in F&H, i.e., subjects
were instructed that the payoﬀ of agent i would be deﬁned as pii = pi.
In the second main experimental treatment Team a subject i was ran-
domly and anonymously matched with a diﬀerent subject j to form a
team. Subjects were told that team-member i's individual payoﬀ would
be deﬁned according to the following sharing rule: pii =
1/2 · (pi + pj).
Subjects also learned that team-member j's payoﬀ would be exactly the
same, i.e., pij = pii.
In our control treatment, Team-Mixed, we varied the subjects' inﬂu-
ence on the team members' payoﬀ. In this treatment two types existed,
a player i with individual compensation and a player j with team com-
pensation. Subject i was randomly and anonymously matched with a
diﬀerent subject j to form a team. Subject i was informed that her own
payoﬀ was determined according to the following rule: pii =
1/2 · (pi+ pc)
with pc representing the output determined by a random die roll exe-
cuted by the computer. It is important to note that the setting in Team
diﬀered from the individual compensation setting in Team-Mixed. In the
1We decided to include a rather abstract but in HR-departments frequently used
personality construct measure, which was apparently unrelated to the preceding
die rolling task. In order to not induce an experimenter demand eﬀect we refrained
from explicitly asking about underlying motives regarding subjects' behavior in
the die rolling task.
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latter subject i's payoﬀ did not depend on subject j's reported outcome.
The payoﬀ of player j with team compensation in Team-Mixed was de-
termined according to the following rule: pij =
1/2 · (pi+ pj). This payoﬀ
rule is similar to the one applied in our treatment Team, however, sub-
ject j in Team-Mixed did not produce a positive externality for subject
i. Hence, the payoﬀ of player i with individual compensation was de-
termined by i's own die roll and a random draw. The payoﬀ of player
j with team compensation was determined by j's own die roll and the
roll of the player with individual compensation. Both team members
were also informed about the compensation rule of the respective other
team member. We designed the Team-Mixed treatment such that the
marginal gains from lying for both player types were the same as the
marginal gains from lying in the Team treatment.
Subjects were asked to privately role the die in their cubicles and to jot
down the appearing number on a sheet of paper, which was handed out to
the subjects and collected afterwards.2 This procedure ensured that the
experimenter was not able to observe the truly diced numbers whatsoever
and this was known to the subjects. Hence subjects could easily lie about
their rolled number and consequently could secretly manipulate their
payoﬀs that were solely dependent on their reported production output.
After subjects had reported their production outputs they ﬁlled in the
personality questionnaire which was administered after the die roll. At
the end of the sessions, each subject k was privately paid pik, which was
calculated based on the reported production outputs and the respective
payoﬀ rule. Each payoﬀ unit was worth e1 . It should be emphasized that
we designed the incentive schemes such that they were comparable with
respect to two important characteristics. First, the expected payoﬀ of a
subject was e2.50 under all experimental treatments if one assumes that
all subjects honestly reported their true numbers. Secondly, in our two
main treatments Individual and Team, if all subjects behaved selﬁshly
2To be more precise we asked them to jot down the very ﬁrst number that appeared
on the die. In fact we followed the procedure of F&H and explicitly allowed the
subjects to roll the die several times. As F&H we argued that by doing so subjects
could assure themselves of the die being fair.
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and maximally exaggerated their numbers they earned e5.
3.3 Hypotheses
We are primarily interested in whether agents are inclined to lie more
under the individual piece rate or the team incentive scheme. As men-
tioned earlier two competing hypothesis are at hand. The ﬁrst one relates
to the fact that the marginal gain from lying is higher under the indi-
vidual piece-rate scheme than under the team incentives. If one assumes
increasing costs of lying one can derive our ﬁrst hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: More lying is observed under the individual piece-
rate incentive scheme than under the team incentive scheme.
On the other hand, under the team incentive scheme a liar has the
excuse that lying comes with doing something good for the other member
of the team, i.e., a lie is partly a white lie. Such an excuse is not available
under the individual piece-rate incentive scheme. Furthermore, under
the team incentive scheme subjects' individual deceptive acts are not
unambiguously attributable to them individually. Due to this possible
diﬀusion of responsibility of a seemingly overreported payoﬀ subjects
might be more inclined to overreport. These considerations result in our
second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2 : More lying is observed under the team incentive
scheme than under the individual piece-rate incentive scheme.
To see which of the two hypotheses can be supported we have to turn
to our data.
3.4 Results
Our main results are summarized in Figure 3.1 and in Table 3.1. In
the ﬁgure we see the distribution of reported production outputs in our
treatments. Rolling fair dices should generate a uniform distribution of
production outputs (dashed line), i.e., every possible production output
should come up with the same probability of 1
6
, and an average actual
production output of 2.5.
The left side of Figure 3.1 shows the results of our treatment Individ-
ual. For comparative reasons the white bars indicate the results of the
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Figure 3.1: Relative frequency of reported production outputs in the
three diﬀerent treatments
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Note: The dashed line represents the expected true value of 0.16.
baseline treatment of F&H. Visual inspection already reveals that the
results of our treatment Individual are very similar to their results. In-
deed, a Mann-Whitney-U-test (MWU-test) comparing the distribution of
reported production outputs between both treatments reveals that there
is no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence (p=0.224, two-sided). A compar-
ison of the treatment Individual with the treatment Team - shown in
the second panel of Figure 3.1 - provides insights regarding our research
question.
Observation 1: Reported production outputs are signiﬁcantly
higher in treatment Team than in treatment Individual.
While subjects report on average 3.31 in treatment Individual, they re-
port on average 3.86 in the treatment Team. Subjects report signiﬁcantly
higher production outputs in the treatment Team than in treatment Indi-
vidual (MWU-test: p=0.003, two-sided).3 The observation that subjects
3F&H report an average of 3.52 in their baseline treatment. Also the distributions
of numbers in F&H's baseline treatment and in Team are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
(MWU-test: p=0.022, two-sided).
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics
Treatment n Type p¯i Reported production output pi (rel. frequencies)
0 1 2 3 4 5
Team 132 3.86 .04−−− .05−−− .10−− .08−−− .27+++ .45+++
Individual 156 3.31∗∗∗ .08 −−− .12− .08−−− .13 .26+++ .31+++
Team-Mixed
130 (I) 3.36∗∗∗ .10−− .05−−− .10−− .18 .27+++ .30+++
136 (T) 3.63 .04−−− .10−− .11−− .12−− .24++ .40+++
F&H 389 3.52∗∗ .06−−− .07−−− .12−−− .13−− .27+++ .35+++
Notes: p¯i is the average reported production output. (I) represents the player with individual
compensation in Team-Mixed , (T) stands for the player with team compensation in Team-Mixed .
Stars show the signiﬁcance of a two-sided Mann-Whitney-U test (∗=10 %-level, ∗∗=5 %-level, ∗∗∗=1
%-level) comparing the distribution of reported production outputs with the treatment Team with
the hypothesis that reported production outputs are equally distributed. Plus and minus signs
display the signiﬁcance of a one-sided binomial test indicating that the observed relative frequency
is smaller (larger) than 1
6
(−(+)=10 %-level, −−(++)=5 %-level, −−−(+++)=1 %-level).
are more inclined to lie under the team incentive scheme is also supported,
when comparing the frequencies of the maximal possible exaggeration,
i.e., a reported production output of 5.
Observation 2: A production output of 5 is reported more often
in treatment Team than in Treatment Individual.
This observation is backed by a χ2-test (p=0.014, two-sided). In line
with the ﬁndings of F&H we also observe that lying is `incomplete' in
our two treatments.
Observation 3: Incomplete lying is observed in both treatments,
Team and Individual.
Support for this observation is shown in Table 3.1. The results indi-
cate that in both treatments the frequencies of reported production of
4 signiﬁcantly exceed the frequency that one would expect from honest
subjects. While in both treatments 0, 1 and 2 are reported signiﬁcantly
less often, only the frequency of the production output of 3 under indi-
vidual incentives cannot be distinguished from the relative frequency of
1
6
.
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Observation 4: When investigating why lying is more pro-
nounced in treatment Team than in treatment Individual the ar-
gument of diﬀusion of responsibility is likely to have a stronger
force than the white lie justiﬁcation.
To generate deeper insights into the underlying motives for the more
pronounced lying in Team than in Individual we run the control treat-
ment Team-Mixed. One explanation for the increased lying in Team
might be the justiﬁcation to do something good for the other team mem-
ber. To investigate this white lie justiﬁcation we compare the players with
team-compensation in Team-Mixed with the players in Team. Note that
the reported production output of the player with team-compensation in
Team-Mixed has no impact on the other team member. Otherwise the
two incentive situations are the same.
The average reported production output of players with team compen-
sation in the Team-Mixed is statistically indistinguishable from players in
Team (3.63 vs. 3.86, MWU-test: p=0.186, two-sided). Since the output
of the former compensation scheme has no eﬀect on the earnings of the
other team member one would expect that players in the treatment Team
report higher outputs (compare our hypothesis 2). Thus, it is not very
likely that the pronounced lying in the treatment Team in comparison
to treatment Individual is mainly driven by the white lie justiﬁcation.4
Another explanation for the diﬀerences in lying in Individual and Team
could be diﬀusion of responsibility. To test this we compare behavior of
players with individual compensation in Team-Mixed and behavior of
players in Team. In the latter treatment the responsibility for possible
deceptive actions might be obscured.
The players with individual compensation in Team-Mixed report on
average a signiﬁcantly smaller number than subjects in Team (3.36 vs.
3.86, MWU-test: p=0.004, two-sided). In both settings, reported out-
4Interestingly, our ﬁnding is diﬀerent from the results reported by Wiltermuth (2011)
who ﬁnds in a real-eﬀort anagram task that people are more likely to cheat when
another person also beneﬁts from it. In line with our study, Danilov et al. (2013)
investigate advice giving in an experiment with ﬁnancial professionals. In general,
they ﬁnd no diﬀerence in deceptive self-serving advice giving when professionals
operate under team versus individual incentives. Only when professionals in a
team have established social ties they tend to convey more self-serving advice
which harms clients.
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puts have a positive eﬀect on the other team members' earnings. The
diﬀerence is that in Team it is less obvious who of the two team mem-
bers actually lied. This is not the case for the player with individual
compensation in Team-Mixed. Thus, diﬀusion of responsibility seems to
encourage players in Team to lie more than players in Individual.5 In
the following we will check the robustness of our main ﬁndings control-
ling for individual diﬀerence variables collected after the die roll task.
Relating gender, age, and personality traits with (over)reported produc-
tion outputs unveils some further interesting insights about potential
determinants of lying behavior. In Table 3.2 we run a series of linear
regression models to predict reported production outputs by stepwise
including Treatments, Female, Age, and Big-Five personality factors as
explanatory variables. In all three regression models treatment Team
serves as a reference group. Models (1)-(3) show that our main ﬁnding
on the inﬂuence of team incentives on lying behavior (Observation 1) is
quite robust. Furthermore, these models underline that players under
both individual incentive schemes report smaller numbers than players
under the two team incentives schemes. Thus, diﬀusion of responsibility
seems to encourage players in Team to lie more than players in Individ-
ual. Our ﬁnding is in line with Mazar and Aggarwal (2011) who have
shown that in an interdependent setting, individuals feel less responsible
for their own actions and this mediates the likelihood to transgress.
5The behavior of the player with individual compensation in Team-Mixed oﬀers an-
other valuable insight: One might argue that subjects have a minimum earnings
goal that they want to reach by over-reporting production outputs and since the
marginal gain from lying in Team is only half of that in Individual, cheating might
be higher in Team. To test this claim we compare the reported production outputs
of players with individual compensation from Team-Mixed (marginal gain equal
to 12 ) with those from Individual (marginal gain equal to 1). Note that in both
treatments players cannot diﬀuse their responsibility, i.e., they do not beneﬁt from
another player's production output. We ﬁnd that players with individual compen-
sation from Team-Mixed (3.36) do not report signiﬁcantly higher outputs than
those from Individual (3.31) (MWU-test: p=0.959, two-sided). This is remarkable
given the fact that players with individual compensation from Team-Mixed even
have an excuse to over-report because another player would beneﬁt from their lies.
Thus, the motive of a minimum earnings goal seems not to play a decisive role.
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Table 3.2: Explaining reported production output pi
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: Reported production output pi
Individual -0.550∗∗∗ -0.502∗∗∗ -0.518∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Team-Mixed (I) -0.502∗∗∗ -0.351∗ -0.369∗
(0.19) (0.20) (0.20)
Team-Mixed (T) -0.239 -0.165 -0.179
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Female -0.392∗∗∗ -0.475∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.16)
Age -0.0264∗∗ -0.0157
(0.01) (0.01)
Openness 0.0616
(0.07)
Conscientiousness -0.115
(0.09)
Extraversion 0.183∗∗
(0.07)
Neuroticism 0.177∗∗
(0.08)
Constant 3.864∗∗∗ 4.654∗∗∗ 3.646∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.35) (0.59)
Observations 554 546 544
R-squared 0.020 0.039 0.059
Notes: OLS-regression coeﬃcients (robust standard errors in parentheses), reference group: Team
treatment; we did not include the personality factor Agreeableness in the regressions since its scale
reliability was too low. The number of observation diﬀers due to missing values. Individual, Team-
Mixed (I) and Team-Mixed (T) represent dummy variables for the respective treatments.∗∗∗p<0.001,
∗∗p<0.05, ∗p<0.1.
We also ﬁnd that women and older subjects on average report sig-
niﬁcantly lower production outputs than men and younger subjects, re-
spectively. These eﬀects are also robust when controlling for the other
variables (models (2) and (3)). Moreover, when pooling the data of all
three treatments we see that women report a production output of zero
signiﬁcantly more often than men (χ2-test: p=0.019, two-sided). Recall
that reporting a zero is a strong indicator of honesty since it results in
a payoﬀ of zero. There is an ongoing discussion on whether women tend
to lie less than men when payoﬀs are at stake. Some studies support the
notion of the less lying female gender (Ross and Robertson, 2000; Dreber
and Johannesson, 2008; Ellingsen et al., 2009; Pruckner and Sausgruber,
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2013). However, results from these studies do not always turn out to
be signiﬁcant and there are also studies, which endorse that women lie
more than men (Tyler and Feldman, 2004; Tyler et al., 2006) or that
there are no diﬀerences in lying behavior among genders (Lewis, 1993;
DePaulo et al., 1996; Rowatt et al., 1998; Cadsby et al., 2010; Belot and
Schröder, 2012). Our study is in line with the ﬁrst stream of literature.
Showing that age is negatively correlated with reported production out-
puts conﬁrms previous ﬁndings on the relationship between age and lying
behavior (i.e., see Ross and Robertson, 2000). Given the small variance
in age in our student sample (SD=4.9) we do not want to overemphasize
this result but we consider it quite interesting that the standard result
can already be conﬁrmed with our data.
To check for the inﬂuence of the Big-Five personality factors, we in-
cluded four of the ﬁve factors into our model. Scale reliability is accept-
able for Extraversion (Cronbach's α=0.69), Conscientiousness (0.475),
Neuroticism (0.587), and Openness (0.559). For Agreeableness scale re-
liability is unacceptably low (0.107); therefore we refrain from using this
factor in our analysis.6 Model (3) shows that when controlling for Treat-
ment, Female, and Age, Extraversion and Neuroticism positively predict
reported production outputs. Our ﬁnding supports previous results that
extravert individuals - who are seen as gregarious, assertive, active, self-
conscious, and excitement seeking and who like to participate in social
interactions - are more inclined to tell lies than introvert persons (Kashy
and DePaulo, 1996; Rowatt et al., 1998). There might also be lies born
out of insecurity: people who have low self-consciousness and who are
anxious may also choose to lie to appear more compliant and more mo-
tivated (e.g., Buss and Briggs, 1984; Kashy and DePaulo, 1996) - this
inclination might be especially enhanced when those people can disguise
their lies. We ﬁnd support for this conjecture: subjects scoring high in
the Neuroticism domain report higher production outputs.
We conclude that team incentives really matter for honest conduct. In-
dividual diﬀerence variables are also correlated with subjects' inclination
6Rammstedt and John themselves point to a noticeable and substantial loss in re-
liability and validity in their 2-item Agreeableness scale as compared to larger
Big-Five personality measures like, e.g., NEO-PI-R or BFI-44 (see Rammstedt
and John, 2007, p.210).
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to lie.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
We investigate the inﬂuence of two widespread compensation schemes
on agents' inclination to lie. By employing a simple experimental de-
sign introduced by Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) and controlling
for individual diﬀerence variables (Female, Age, and Big-Five personal-
ity traits) we ﬁnd that lying is prevalent under both schemes but more
pronounced under team incentives than individual piece-rates. This ro-
bust ﬁnding highlights a so far fairly neglected feature of compensation
schemes. It shows that organizations are well advised to be vigilant
regarding potentially harming side-eﬀects of compensation schemes, es-
pecially when agents can diﬀuse or displace their responsibility for un-
ethical conduct. Our study shows that besides beneﬁting others, agents
working under team incentives might be particularly prone to lying and
deception because it is easier to hide individual wrongdoing under a team
than an individual compensation scheme which makes it more diﬃcult
to pinpoint a liar in teams. Interestingly, this ﬁnding on the corruptive
eﬀect of a contingent responsibility shift supports an argument raised by
Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013). In their seminal paper they show
that many subjects do not lie to the full extend, i.e., subjects report an
outcome of 4 instead of 5 (see also Observation 3). The authors argue
that subjects know that honesty might be a favorable trait and if a 4 is
assessed diﬀerently than a 5 in respect to honesty, it might be reasonable
not to lie to the full extent and to try to disguise the lie and appear
honest. Similarly, players in our treatment Team and players with team
compensation in Team-Mixed might also see lying to be unethical but
they are able to diﬀuse their responsibility.
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3.6 Appendix
Instructions of the Experiment (translated from German)
Statistical Survey
For a statistical survey (independent of the previous experiment) we ask
you to answer some brief questions. To determine your payment for
answering the upcoming questions, we ask you to roll a die. If you roll
a 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 you receive the diced number as points. If you roll a 6
you receive 0 points. The following applies to you:
{[Individual ] For answering the questions, the points will be paid to you
in Euro.}
{[Team] Another subject will be randomly assigned to you. The points
of this subject and your points will be added up. For answering the
questions, you and the other subject each will be paid half of the sum of
these points in Euro.}
{[Team-Mixed, Player with individual compensation] Another subject
will be randomly assigned to you. Your points and the points of a random
die roll by the computer will be added up. For answering the questions,
you will be paid half of the sum of these points in Euro.
The following rules apply for the subject assigned to you: The points
of this subject and your points will be added up. For answering the
questions, this subject will be paid half of the sum of these points in
Euro.}
{[Team-Mixed, Player with team compensation] Another subject will be
randomly assigned to you. The points of this subject and your points
will be added up. For answering the questions, you will be paid half of
the sum of these points in Euro.
The following rules apply for the subject assigned to you: The points
of this subject and the points of a random die roll by the computer will
be added up. For answering the questions, this subject will be paid half
of the sum of these points in Euro. That is, the payment of the other
subject does not depend on your die roll.}
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Now, please dice your number (the number diced at the ﬁrst time counts;
afterwards you can roll the die several times to check if the die is really
fair). Now enter the diced number that you have rolled at the ﬁrst time:
[_]
When you are ready, please fold this sheet once and hold it out of the
cubicle. When all subjects are done the sheets will be collected. Af-
terwards the questionnaire will be handed out to you. We ask you to
carefully answer the questions.
{} = Indicate the phrase that is exclusively employed in the respective
treatment, [Individual ], [Team] or [Team-Mixed ].
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4 The Eﬀect of
Communication Channels
on Lying
4.1 Introduction
Everyday people use a large variety of communication channels to inter-
act with others on and oﬀ the job. Think about an employee who has
to report the hours he has worked on a project to determine his hourly
pay. The actual working time is the employee's private information and
can be reported via email or phone. Or imagine a job candidate who
has to disclose information to a potential employer, e.g., about his or
her current wage level to determine the future income. The information
can be requested over an online application system or verbally during an
interview. The veracity of private information transmissions might cru-
cially depend on whether the private information is reported verbally, by
phone, or via computer. In one situation people may be more likely to lie
than in others. This paper investigates how reporting behavior is aﬀected
by communication channels. The answers may lead to fruitful insights
not only for economics but also for e-commerce, for example when cre-
ating online platforms, and organizational designers, for instance when
developing corporate reporting structures.
The most natural way of communicating is face-to-face. Communi-
cating parties see and hear each other and can instantly respond. Due
to technological improvements during the last decades, people now com-
monly make use of a large variety of other communication channels. In
addition to the classic telephone at home, mobile phones are common.
Moreover, text-based and computer-mediated communication, such as
e-mails and instant messaging, are established ways of communicating
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both at the workplace and in private life. These diﬀerent communica-
tion channels change the communication environment. A fundamental
diﬀerence is denoted by verbal, such as face-to-face, and nonverbal, for
example e-mail, communication. Verbal and synchronous communication
is thereby characterized by verbal clues (e.g., tone of voice), visual clues
(e.g., body language), and social clues (e.g., status; see Bicchieri and Lev-
On, 2011). Non-verbal communication is marked by non-synchronicity
and recordability (see Hancock et al., 2004). In line with this diﬀerentia-
tion, media richness theory classiﬁes diﬀerent channels of communication
with respect to their richness. A medium becomes richer the more it is
able to transmit diﬀerent types of information from a sender to a receiver
(see Daft and Lengel, 1986). Face-to-face communication is considered
to be the richest medium as it provides synchronicity and multiple clues
systems.
This paper experimentally investigates whether lying is aﬀected by the
channel of communication. There are few other studies that look at how
communication channels inﬂuence lying behavior. Valley et al. (1998)
study a bilateral negotiation game with asymmetric information, ﬁnding
diﬀerent degrees of trust, truth-telling and eﬃciency across communi-
cation channels. Subjects negotiating face-to-face achieve higher joint
beneﬁts due to higher levels of truth-telling than those negotiating by
telephone or in writing. However, in their game, subjects had incentives
to behave honestly in order to achieve eﬃcient outcomes (see also Valley
et al., 2002).
From the ﬁeld of social psychology, Frank (1988) highlights that phys-
ical `tell tale clues', such as facial expressions, blushing and tone of voice,
exist under synchronous communication. As these clues are diﬃcult to
control for, people may be, for instance, more cautious about lying face-
to-face than in writing emails. In line with this, DePaulo et al. (1996)
also argue that people will avoid most direct modes of social interaction
when telling lies (see, more generally, Vrij (2010), on lying detection).1
In analyzing people's diaries, research in communication science comes
to ﬁndings diﬀerent than those in social psychology. Hancock et al.
1In his classic studies on obedience to authority, Milgram (1965) varied the the `close-
ness of authority': in one condition the experimenter gave instructions face-to-face
whereas in the other by phone. In the later condition subjects were signiﬁcantly
less obedient.
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(2004) ﬁnd that synchronicity and recordability of communication pri-
marily matters for the decision of whether to lie or not. They state that
the majority of lies occur spontaneously and unplanned. In their anal-
ysis, they ﬁnd that synchronous channels are more prone to deception,
while users of recordable and non-synchronous channels seem to be more
cautious when lying, as false claims might be reviewable.
Brosig et al. (2003) analyze the eﬀects of diﬀerent communication chan-
nels on cooperation in several standard public good games. The authors
vary the communication channel applied in pre-play communication, e.g.,
auditory or visual channels, either bidirectional or unidirectional. They
ﬁnd that bidirectional face-to-face communication is crucial for enhanc-
ing cooperation.2 In line with this result, Bicchieri and Lev-On (2007)
state that face-to-face communication more easily focuses agents on so-
cial norms, i.e., to cooperate in social dilemma games.3
In a coin ﬂip study by Abeler et al. (2014), a representative sample
of the German population was called and asked at home to report the
outcome of one single coin ﬂip or four coin ﬂips, respectively. Before
reporting the outcome of the private coin ﬂip(s), a 20-minute survey-
interview was conducted on the phone. In the single coin ﬂip case, par-
ticipants received a payment if tails comes up. If they were asked to ﬂip
the coin four times, each tails ﬂip triggered a payment. The reported
outcome and not the actual outcome of the coin ﬂip(s) determined the
individual pay. The authors do not ﬁnd dishonest reporting either in the
single or in the four coin ﬂip case. In two laboratory control treatments,
subjects reported their outcomes either via phone or computer. While
they ﬁnd signiﬁcant over-reporting in the laboratory, average reporting
between the two communication channels is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent.
However, subjects reported the payoﬀ-maximizing outcome, i.e., 4 times
tails, more often via computer (see also Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi
2Brosig (2002) also underlines the importance of face-to-face communication for
cooperation. The author ﬁnds that cooperation in a prisoner's dilemma only
results when the other player can be identiﬁed as cooperative beforehand during
a pre-play communication phase. Moreover, she shows that subjects who are
classiﬁed as cooperative type in a preceding task are better at identifying their
partner's willingness to cooperate in the subsequent prisoner's dilemma game.
3Bordia (1997) reviews the eﬀects of face-to-face and computer-mediated communi-
cation on group behavior. He ﬁnds that groups who communicate via the computer
are more prone to uninhibited behavior, e.g., rude and oﬀensive actions.
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2013, on `partial lying').4
The present experiment employs an experimental design similar to the
one used by Abeler et al. (2014), yet it systematically varies four common
means of communication, i.e., face-to-face, phone, computer-mediated,
and online. Subjects are instructed to privately ﬂip a coin four times.
Each time tails comes up, they earn an additional e1 on top of a ﬁxed
payment of e7 for completing a required post-experimental question-
naire. After the four coin ﬂips, subjects have to report the number of
tails. In comparison to many other studies on lying (e.g., Fischbacher and
Föllmi-Heusi, 2013), this experiment is not conducted after another unre-
lated experiment (see also Houser et al., 2012), but rather as stand-alone
session. The compensation structure incentivizes subjects to dishonestly
over-report the true number of tails. Across experimental treatments,
the applied channel of communication varies between (i) face-to-face, (ii)
telephone, (iii) computer-mediated, and (iv) online communication. As
the true outcomes of the single coin ﬂips are unknown, aggregate be-
havior of the reported outcomes is compared to the true distribution of
four fair coin ﬂips. Lying is measured by the deviation of the reported
outcomes from the expected truthful distribution. The results show that
subjects lie independently of the communication channel applied. The
extent of lying, however, diﬀers signiﬁcantly: more subjects lie to the
full extent, i.e., they report an outcome of 4 times tails, in treatments
with computer-mediated and online communication, whereas partial ly-
ing, i.e., reporting an outcome of 3 tails ﬂips, is prevalent in treatments
with more personal and synchronous communication. The ﬁndings un-
derline the variation in lying costs across decision making environments
(see Mazar and Ariely, 2006). Image concerns (e.g., Bénabou and Ti-
role, 2006; Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009) and social distance arguments
(e.g., Bohnet and Frey, 1999) both have possible explanatory value for
this variation. Physical clues, which can aﬀect the probability of lies be-
ing detected, are also considered as a possible mediating inﬂuence (e.g.,
Frank, 1988).
The next section explains the design of the study in detail. In section
4Houser et al. (2012) and Bucciol and Piovesan (2011) conducted laboratory studies
with single coin ﬂips and also ﬁnd dishonest over-reporting. In both studies,
however, subjects had to write down the outcome of their private coin ﬂip on a
sheet of paper.
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3 the theoretical considerations are reviewed and behavioral hypotheses
are derived. Section 4 presents the results. Sections 5 and 6 discuss the
results and conclude.
4.2 Experiment
4.2.1 Experimental Design
Subjects can earn money by privately ﬂipping a coin four times. Nobody
apart from the respective subject, i.e., neither the experimenters nor any
other subject, can observe the actual outcome of the four coin ﬂips. Each
time the coin lands on tails subjects receive e1. Accordingly, participants
can earn e0, 1, 2, 3, or 4 by reporting 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4 tails outcomes.
The payoﬀ depends on reported outcomes and subjects can increase their
total payoﬀ by lying. After ﬂipping the coin subjects are required to ﬁll
in a questionnaire for which they are paid a ﬁxed wage of e7.
The means of communicating the number of tails are systematically
varied in four experimental treatments. In the ﬁrst treatment - Face-
to-Face (henceforth: F-t-F ) - subjects report the number of tails to a
research assistant in their cabins. In the second treatment - Phone -
subjects are contacted by the research assistant through a telephone line,
i.e., Skype. Each subject in the cabin is equipped with a headset and
headphone. Subjects are called by the research assistant and asked to
report the number of tails. In the third treatment - PC-Lab - no direct
verbal communication is employed. Here, subjects are asked to report
the number of tails through an entry mask on their computer screen
and send it to the research assistant. This treatment resembles e-mail
communication practiced daily in organizations. In the fourth treatment
- PC-Online - subjects participate in an online experiment. Again they
are asked to toss a coin four times at home.5 Similar to the PC-Lab
treatment, subjects are asked to report the number of tails over an online
entry mask. The treatment variations are summarized in Table 4.1.
Afterwards, subjects answer a comprehensive questionnaire about de-
mographics and personality traits that might help to better understand
5The coin-ﬂip task is especially suitable as it can be expected that subjects always
have a coin with them.
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Table 4.1: Treatment variations
Treatment Variation of communication channel n (% female)
Face-to-Face Reporting outcome face-to-face 60 (50%)
Phone Reporting outcome via a telephone line 60 (50%)
PC-Lab Reporting outcome via PC in the lab 60 (50%)
PC-Online Reporting outcome via PC online outside the lab 66 (45%)
lying behavior.6 In addition, subjects are asked what 100 random peo-
ple would have reported if tails actually had come up zero times (once,
twice, three times, four times). Given that ﬁlling in the questionnaire
might inﬂuence subjects' reporting behavior, subjects are asked to ﬂip
the coin and report the outcome before ﬁlling in the questionnaire.
4.2.2 Experimental Procedures
A total of 246 subjects (with a mean age of 24 and 49% being female) par-
ticipated in the experiment. The treatments F-t-F, Phone, and PC-Lab
were conducted at the `elfe' laboratory of the University of Duisburg-
Essen. The treatment PC-Online was conducted online. All subjects
were recruited from the same pool of over 2000 students via ORSEE
(Greiner, 2003). Treatments F-t-F, Phone and PC-Lab each consisted
of 60 subjects, and 66 subjects took part in treatment PC-Online. The
experiment was computerized using the BoXS software (Seithe, 2012).
Each laboratory session involved 12 subjects. In total, 15 laboratory ses-
sions and one online session were conducted in November 2013. Approx-
imately 30% of the subjects were economics or business administration
majors. The other 70% were enrolled in diﬀerent ﬁelds of study, such
as law and the natural sciences. Subjects were randomly assigned to
soundproof cabins. We asked subjects to take a random coin out of their
personal wallet to use for the coin ﬂips.7 It was also clearly explained
that participants would be asked to ﬁll in a 25-minute questionnaire and
that they would receive a ﬁxed wage of e 7.8 The content of the in-
6The 10-item BIG Five inventory (Rammstedt and John, 2007), a survey with re-
spect to the Schwartz' values theory (Schwartz, 1992), and questions on Machi-
avellianism (Geis and Moon, 1981) were employed.
7In case a subject did not posses a coin, we provided a jar of coins from which a
personal coin could be taken.
8The original instructions are written in German. The instructions provided in the
appendix are translated from German into English.
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structions was held constant between the treatments, i.e., independent
of whether verbal or non-verbal communication was tested, the same
wording was employed. In the treatments with verbal communication,
i.e., F-t-F and Phone, the same female research assistant communicated
with the subjects following an identical protocol.9 In the treatment PC-
Online, subjects registered for online sessions. At the beginning of the
online experiment, participants received an e-mail with a personalized
link. Clicking the link routed subjects to online screens identical to the
one used in the laboratory sessions of the treatment PC-Lab. In the
questionnaire, 87% of subjects indicated that they were at home for the
PC-Online treatment. The other subjects were at other locations, such
as in the library or oﬃce.
Finally, participants privately received their payoﬀs. In the treatment
PC-Online, payments were transferred to subjects' bank accounts. On
average, participants earned e 9.77, and the sessions lasted for approxi-
mately 35 minutes.
4.3 Theoretical Considerations and
Behavioral Hypotheses
Game theory assumes that selﬁsh agents maximize own payoﬀs and hence
misreport their private information if it beneﬁts them (Crawford and So-
bel, 1982). Thus, from a standard economic perspective it is not obvious
why people should not report four tails ﬂips, independent of the treat-
ment variations. This results in the following (null-)hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: Lying to the full extent is observed independent
of the channel of communication.
Research in experimental economics has shown that a large share of
subjects misreport private information to their own material advantage
(see Croson, 2005, for a review). A considerable share of subjects, how-
ever, refrains from lying maximally, which Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi
9Note that a research assistant was intentionally chosen to communicate with the
subjects, as the experimenter might have been biased in his interaction with the
subjects. In both treatments the research assistant asked How many of your four
coin tosses came up with tails? .
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(2013) label as `partial lying'. These ﬁndings suggest individual hetero-
geneity with respect to lying. Theoretical models try to capture these
behavioral patterns by considering heterogeneous (psychosocial) moral
costs of lying (see, Kartik, 2009; Gibson et al., 2013).
The relevance and the extent of lying costs could be aﬀected by the
social environment in which incentives to lie are prevalent (Mazar and
Ariely, 2006). The communication channel in place might inﬂuence lying
costs on at least two levels, though (1) self- and social-image concerns
(e.g., Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009) and (2)
social distance arguments (e.g., Hoﬀman et al., 1996; Bohnet and Frey,
1999). Both levels are also connected to the detectability of dishonest
behavior, which can be assumed to be diﬀerent across diﬀerent channels
of communication. Due to physical `tell tale clues', e.g., facial or verbal
expressions, detectability is higher under synchronous channels compared
to non-synchronous channels (see Frank, 1988; Valley et al., 1998).
First, self- and social-image concerns have been suggested as one pos-
sible explanation for partial lying. Some people engage in partial lying in
order to maintain a positive image of themselves (e.g., Mazar et al., 2008;
Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013). In addition, people want to be per-
ceived as credible and not as greedy, by themselves as well as by others
(e.g., Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; Grossman, 2010). In all treatments self-
image concerns should be present to the same degree, as subjects have to
justify their reported outcome to themselves. The social-image might be
inﬂuenced by the research assistant's observation of the subject's report-
ing behavior and by the information that is transmitted via the reported
outcome. The receiver of the report could form an opinion, i.e., the
social-image, about (the honesty of) the sender. It can be assumed that
this social-image formation does not depend on the reporting medium.
However, the social-image of the subject might be harmed if someone
else can more easily detect dishonest behavior due to physical clues ob-
servable through synchronous channels of communication. Hence, the
interaction of social-image concerns with a higher probability of being
detected when lying may increase the relevance of lying costs.
Second, social distance arguments and social norm activation may be
suited to explain the eﬀects of diﬀerent communication channels on lying.
Gächter and Fehr (1999) deﬁne social distance as the degree of familiar-
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ity or anonymity within a social interaction. Hoﬀman et al. (1996) and
Bohnet and Frey (1999) assume that decreasing social distance increases
pro-social behavior. The latter authors argue that the identiﬁcation of
the `other' causes more prosociality by assuming that the social distance
decreases when (...) the `other' is no longer some unknown individ-
ual from some anonymous crowd but becomes an identiﬁable victim (p.
335).10 With the identiﬁcation of the other, pro-social norms are acti-
vated alongside intrinsic moral norms (Bohnet and Frey, 1999).11 Hence,
the closer a social interaction is, the more both motives prevail, i.e., in-
trinsic moral norms as well as social norms. Under anonymity, however,
only the intrinsic motivation to behave morally is decisive.12 Similar to
social-image concerns, social distance is moderated by the detectability
due to physical clues. The adherence to social norms may be more pro-
nounced in socially close interactions since norm-deviating actions can
be more easily revealed.
Taken together, these lines of reasoning help to derive two alternative
hypotheses about behavior in the four treatments.
Hypothesis 2: More lying is observed under socially
more distant channels of communication, i.e., F (F-t-
F)>F (Phone)>F (PC-Lab)>F (PC-Online), where F (·) denotes
the accumulated distribution of the number of lies in a respective
treatment.
Moreover and related to ﬁndings from other experiments (e.g., Fis-
chbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Abeler et al., 2014), it can also be
hypothesized that more partial lying, i.e., reporting the outcome 3, than
lying to the full extent will be observed in treatments F-t-F and Phone
compared to treatments PC-Lab and PC-Online.
Hypothesis 3: Partial lying is observed more frequently under
channels of communication that are socially more close.
10Charness and Gneezy (2008) specify social distance as the extent of physical and
emotional proximity induced by a situation (see also Charness et al., 2007). They
state that the inﬂuence of social distance is especially relevant for e-commerce.
11By following Bicchieri (2006), social norms can be deﬁned as rules or standards of
behavior in a reference network such that individuals prefer to conform to them.
12Schram and Charness (2011) argue that an increasing number of decisions are
being made privately behind a computer screen, which underlines the importance
of intrinsic moral norms.
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Figure 4.1: Frequencies of reported tails
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Note: The dashed line corresponds to the expected truthful distribution.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Behavior of Subjects
Figure 4.1 depicts the distribution of reported outcomes across treat-
ments. The dashed line represents the expected frequency if every par-
ticipant reported the true outcome of the four coin ﬂips. The main results
are also summarized in Table 4.2.
Observation 1: In all treatments, the overall distribution of re-
ported outcomes is signiﬁcantly shifted to the right of the truthful
distribution.
Figure 4.1 reveals that in all treatments the observed distributions of
reported outcomes diﬀer from the theoretical benchmark. The most fre-
quent outcome reported is 3, i.e., a majority of subjects refrains from
reporting the payoﬀ-maximizing outcome of 4. The distribution of re-
ported outcomes in all four treatments is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the
truthful distribution (Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, all four p<0.01). This
ﬁnding is also conﬁrmed by binomial tests. In the treatments Phone, PC-
Lab and PC-Online, the frequencies of reporting 1 or 2 are signiﬁcantly
below the expected distribution, whereas the frequencies of reported out-
comes of 3 and 4 are signiﬁcantly above the honest distribution (see Table
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Table 4.2: Overview of results
Treatment n r¯i Belief r¯i Reported outcome ri (rel. frequencies)
0 1 2 3 4
F-t-F 60 2.73 2.85 0.02 0.02−−− 0.3 0.55+++ 0.12
Phone 60 2.75 2.89 0.02 0.07−− 0.22−−− 0.55+++ 0.15++
PC-Lab 60 2.71 2.80 0.00− 0.12−− 0.23−− 0.47+++ 0.18+++
PC-Online 66 2.86 2.86 0.00−− 0.08−−− 0.24−− 0.42++ 0.26+++
Honest distribution 2 0.06 0.25 0.38 0.25 0.06
JT test p=0.097 p=0.065 p=0.729 p=0.051 p=0.017
Notes: n stands for the number of observations. r¯i is the average reported output. Plus and mi-
nus signs display the signiﬁcance of a one-sided binomial test indicating that the observed relative
frequency is smaller (larger) than the expected frequency −(+)=10-%-level, −−(++) =5-%-level,
−−−(+++)=1-%-level. JT test stands for applying a Jonckheere-Terpstra test for ordered alterna-
tives (p-values refer to one-sided tests).
4.2 for details). In the F-t-F treatment, the reported frequencies for out-
comes 1 and 3 are also statistically distinguishable from the expected
frequencies. In this treatment, however, the frequencies of reporting 0,
2 and 4 are statistically indistinguishable from the truthful distribution.
The average reported outcomes are not statistically diﬀerent between the
treatments.
Observation 2: The fraction of subjects reporting the outcome
of 4 increases the more distant the means of communication is.
Focusing only on the reported outcome of 4, Figure 1 displays dif-
ferences in reporting this outcome across treatments. According to a
Jonckheere-Terpstra test for ordered alternatives, reporting the highest
possible outcome is more likely as the anonymity of the communication
medium increases (p=0.017, one-sided).
Pairwise comparisons of the fraction of subjects reporting the outcome
4 yields a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between treatments F-t-F and PC-Online,
i.e., 12% in F-t-F and 26% in PC-Online (p=0.04, χ2-test, two-sided).
No statistical diﬀerences exist for other pairwise treatment comparisons
(see also Table A4.1 in the appendix for probit regressions on reporting
the outcome 4).
In treatment PC-Online, 30% of the women report the outcome 4,
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whereas in the other treatments only 10% or less of the women report
the highest possible outcome (see also Figure A4.1 and A4.2 in the ap-
pendix). Pairwise χ2-tests of the fractions of women reporting the out-
come 4 yield signiﬁcant diﬀerences between treatment PC-Online and
the other treatments (p=0.053 between PC-Online and F-t-F as well as
Phone, and p=0.02 between PC-Online and PC-Lab, two-sided). Com-
parisons between reporting behavior of men and women reveal no statis-
tical diﬀerences.13
Observation 3: Partial lying is more pronounced in treatments
where the means of communication is less anonymous.
Subjects across treatments most frequently report outcome 3. Accord-
ing to a Jonckheere-Terpstra-test, reporting this outcome is more likely
as the anonymity of the communication channel decreases (p=0.051, one-
sided). Pairwise treatment comparisons show no statistical diﬀerences.
Observation 4: Being high in Conformity values has a negative
eﬀect on reporting high outcomes.
Ordered logistic regressions of the reported outcomes with several co-
variates were run that are displayed in Table 4.3. Model (1), dummy vari-
ables of the treatments were included, which have no signiﬁcant eﬀect on
reported outcomes. Moreover, neither age nor gender have a signiﬁcant
eﬀect on reporting outcomes (model 2). Model (3) includes a dummy for
Conformity values from the value theory of Schwartz (1992). Subjects
who score higher in Conformity report signiﬁcantly smaller outcomes.14
According to the deﬁnition of the conformity trait, people who score
highly in Conformity values avoid actions and intentions that could up-
set or harm others and violate social norms and expectations (Schwartz,
1992). Other characteristics like religiousness, income, risk attitudes and
Machiavellianism are not signiﬁcantly associated with the reported out-
come (see Table A4.2 in the appendix).
13In contrast, Dreber and Johannesson (2008), for example, ﬁnd that men lie more
often compared to women.
14According to Schwartz's model (1992), people distinguish between at least ten basic
values. These values are Universalism, Benevolence, Tradition, Conformity, Secu-
rity, Power, Achievement, Hedonism, Stimulation, and Self-Direction (Schwartz,
1992).
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Table 4.3: Regression analysis of reported outcomes
Dependent variable:
Number of reported tails (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Phone 0.102 0.072 0.057 0.103 0.037
(0.303) (0.307) (0.312) (0.345) (0.349)
PC-Lab 0.014 -0.006 -0.001 0.020 -0.015
(0.330) (0.332) (0.349) (0.349) (0.354)
PC-Online 0.335 0.337 0.232 0.108 0.245
(0.333) (0.337) (0.341) (0.347) (0.359)
Age -0.034 -0.041
(0.031) (0.033)
Gender (1 if female) -0.083 -0.074
(0.243) (0.252)
Conformity -1.207** -1.245**
(0.415) (0.485)
Belief about other subjects 4.927*** 4.676***
(0.757) (0.766)
Observations 246 246 246 242 242
Pseudo R-squared 0.002 0.004 0.014 0.084 0.087
Notes: Ordered logit estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Reference group is treatment
F-t-F . The number of observations diﬀers because of missing values. Phone, PC-Lab, and PC-Online
represent dummy variables for the respective treatments. "Belief about other subjects" is the belief
about the share of other subjects who report to have ﬂipped more tails than they actually did and
who then report the outcome 4 tails (see section 4.4.2 for details). Signiﬁcances at the 1, 5, and 10
percent level are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
4.4.2 Beliefs about Behavior of Other Subjects
In the questionnaire subjects state what they believe other participants
would have reported. Speciﬁcally, subjects are asked: Imagine what 100
other participants would have reported if they had actually ﬂipped tails
zero (one, two, three, four) times. For every possible actual outcome
they allocated 100 ﬁctitious participants to the ﬁve possible reported
outcomes (i.e., reporting an outcome of 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4 times tails).
Thus in total, subjects ﬁlled in 25 belief questions, ﬁve for each possible
outcome (see appendix for questions on beliefs). The belief elicitation
was not incentivized.
On average, 53.2% of the subjects state that they believe that other
participants report higher outcomes than the actual honest outcomes.
Table 4.2 includes beliefs about average reported outcomes.15 Across
15Beliefs about average reported outcomes are calculated as follows: For each respec-
tive actual outcome of the four coin ﬂips, an average individual belief about the
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Figure 4.2: Actual behavior and beliefs on payoﬀ-maximizing reports






	
	






  	
 	








	




















	
 			
Note: See also Figure A4.3 in the appendix for the full distribution of beliefs over the reported
outcomes.
treatments, average beliefs are not statistically diﬀerent from the actual
reported outcomes.
Figure 4.2 focuses on beliefs about the share of participants who re-
port the payoﬀ-maximizing outcome, i.e., reporting the outcome 4. The
beliefs about reported outcomes (gray bars) are compared with actual
proportions (dark bars). In all four treatments subjects believe that oth-
ers report the outcome 4 more often than they actually do. In contrast
to actual reporting of outcome 4, no diﬀerences in stated beliefs can be
observed between the treatments.
In Table 4.3 model (4), the reported outcome of the four coin ﬂips
is regressed on treatment dummies and beliefs about the share of other
subjects who dishonestly reported the outcome 4. Subjects who believe
that others dishonestly report the highest outcome also report higher
outcomes themselves.16
corresponding reported outcome is calculated which is weighted with the respec-
tive theoretical probability of occurrence. The sum of theses ﬁve values determines
the belief about the average total reported outcome shown in Table 4.2.
16The meaning of ex-post stated beliefs have to be examined cautiously. Subjects
might justify their (dishonest) behavior with a stated belief that others also ex-
aggerated their reports (e.g., Abeler et al., 2014). The other direction might be
also true, i.e., high beliefs about others' reports may induce subjects to also report
higher outcomes (e.g., López-Pérez, 2012).
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4.5 Discussion: Partial Lying and
Communication Channels
Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) ﬁnd that a majority of participants
do not overstate the outcome of a private die roll to full payoﬀ-maximizing
extent. This ﬁnding is replicated by other studies (e.g., Conrads et al.,
2013) and often explained with the idea of self-concept maintenance, i.e.,
people lie partially because it does not require changing one's self-image
as an honest person (Bénabou and Tirole, 2002; Mazar et al., 2008). In
the coin ﬂip task employed in this study, the reported outcome of 3 can
be interpreted a partial lie in case the actual outcome is below 3.
As mentioned by Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013), people may
want to be perceived as credible by themselves and by others. Across all
treatments, subjects are able to maintain a positive self-concept by lying
partially. However, higher identiﬁcation of subjects through a speciﬁc
communication channel may lead to greater activation of the social norm
not to lie to the full extent (see also Biel and Thogersen, 2007). This
activation does not prevent subjects from lying, but rather only seems
to restrain them from payoﬀ-maximizing lying.17 In the treatment PC-
Online, subjects act under the highest degree of anonymity, whereby
only intrinsic moral norms - and not social norms - may be active (see
Schram and Charness, 2011). Here, less partial over-reporting and more
over-reporting to the full extent is found.
The beliefs about other people's behavior, however, do not diﬀer across
treatments. Subjects believe that others over-report the outcome of the
four coin ﬂips, which could be interpreted as the social norm in the given
experimental setup. As pointed out by Bicchieri (2006), these empirical
expectations, i.e., the beliefs about the behavior of others, may not be
suﬃcient to motivate compliance with this social norm. The author
further states that conformity to a social norm also depends on normative
expectations, i.e., the beliefs about what other people believe one should
do. Independent of the treatment variations, it can be assumed that
the normative expectation is not to lie at all. However, as shown by
Bicchieri and Xiao (2009), empirical expectations are usually an accurate
17Also Abeler et al. (2014) found signiﬁcantly less lying to the full extent in their
phone treatment in the laboratory than in the treatment with computer-mediated
communication.
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predictor of actual behavior. This reasoning is best reﬂected in treatment
PC-Online, where actual behavior is close to the empirical expectations.
In the other treatments, the channel of communication might prevent
subjects from completely following their empirical expectations since less
payoﬀ-maximizing over-reporting is observable.
More broadly, an important reason for the observed behavioral pattern
might be that subjects in treatments with synchronous interaction, i.e.,
in F-t-F and Phone, are aware of their physical tell tale clues (see Frank,
1988), i.e., their cadence of voice and facial expressions which might re-
veal dishonest behavior. Although subjects in these treatments are prob-
ably still lying, they might feel to exercise better control over their tell
tale clues when lying partially. By contrast, under computer-mediated
communication they may not fear being detected through physical reac-
tions.
4.6 Conclusion
The inﬂuence of four common communication channels on subjects' in-
clination to lie is investigated by systematically varying the means by
which private information is reported. In a simple experimental coin
ﬂip game with incentives to overstate private information, lying seems
to be prevalent under all channels of communication. Subjects do not
diﬀerentiate between lying face-to-face, on the phone, or via the com-
puter. Lying to the full extent is, however, most pronounced in online
computer-mediated communication when subjects are at home. These
ﬁndings underline that the relevance and the extent of lying costs seem
to diﬀer across diﬀerent environmental settings (see Mazar and Ariely,
2006), which is a rather neglected contextual feature in the economics
literature. On a more general level, the ﬁndings are in line with other
studies showing that more pro-social behavior can be observed under
more direct channels of communication (e.g., Valley et al., 1998; Brosig
et al., 2003). Nevertheless, the results do not allow the identiﬁcation of
a conclusive reason for the observed behavior.
Social distance arguments and social norm activation could explain
behavior, as the distance varies across communication channels and less
over-reporting to the full extent is observed under more socially-close
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channels (Bohnet and Frey, 1999; Charness and Gneezy, 2008). By re-
ducing social distance, both the compliance to one's own moral norms
and social norms may lead to less lying to the full extent compared to
situations with larger social distance, where only intrinsic moral motives
are prevalent.18 This explanation is also inﬂuenced by the probability of
being lying detected, which diﬀers across communication channels due to
physical reactions, for example, cadence of voice (Frank, 1988). Socially
distant interactions are characterized by a smaller probability of being
detected since no physical clues can be observed.
The prevalence of electronic and impersonal communication channels
is unstoppable. Internet businesses and virtual markets are growing. De-
signers of e-commerce platforms and organizational reporting structures
should, however, be aware of possible drawbacks of speciﬁc channels of
communication. Given the ﬁndings of this study, employers, for example,
should ask job candidates face-to-face about their current income, as this
statement might be overstated to the smallest extent in comparison to
online application systems.
A fruitful avenue for future research may be to more deeply analyze
how social norms and pro-social behavior are activated through speciﬁc
contextual conditions. More generally, it seems to be important to bet-
ter understand the eﬀects of depersonalization on social and business
interactions.
18The social distance might even be further reduced the longer individuals interact
with each other since the familiarity increases. For instance, in the study of Abeler
et al. (2014) subjects in one treatment talk to an interviewer for 20 minutes before
reporting the outcome of the coin toss.
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4.7 Appendix
Table A4.1: Probit regressions on reporting the outcome 4
Dependent Variable: (1) (2)
Reporting four tails ﬂips Mrg. Eﬀects Mrg. Eﬀects
[F-t-F ] [0.117***] [0.198]
[0.584] [0.708]
Phone 0.041 0.036
(0.079) (0.079)
PC-Lab 0.079 0.071
(0.082) (0.080)
PC-Online 0.154** 0.159**
(0.083) (0.086)
Age -0.005
(0.007)
Gender (1 if female) -0.073
(0.048)
Observations 246 246
Pseudo R-squared 0.020 0.030
Notes: Coeﬃcients display marginal eﬀects. Reference group (constant) is treatment F-t-F (reported
in square brackets). Phone, PC-Lab, and PC-Online represent dummy variables for the respective
treatments. Signiﬁcances at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level are denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
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Figure A4.1: Frequencies of reported tails by men
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Note: The dashed line corresponds to the expected truthful distribution.
Figure A4.2: Frequencies of reported tails by women
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Note: The dashed line corresponds to the expected truthful distribution.
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Figure A4.3: Beliefs about frequencies of reported tails
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Note: The dashed line corresponds to the expected truthful distribution. See also Figure 4.2 in the
section 4.4.2.
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Instructions of the Experiment (translated from German)
Welcome to today's experiment and thank you for participating. Now,
please carefully read the instructions. In case of questions arise, do not
hesitate to raise your hand. We can personally assist you.
In the following, we ask you to ﬁll in a questionnaire. Your information
will be anonymized. It will take 20-25 minutes to ﬁll in the questionnaire.
For ﬁlling it in you will receive a ﬁxed payment of e7.
Before you start ﬁlling in the questionnaire, we ask you to conduct four
coin tosses. Therefore, please take a coin out of your wallet. {[Face-
to-Face, Phone, PC-Lab: In case you do not have a coin with you, we
will provide you with a coin.]} On one side of the coin there is tails and
one the other side heads. Every time tails comes up, you receive one
additional Euro. You receive e0 if tails never comes up; you receive e1
if tails comes up once; you receive e2 if tails comes up twice; you receive
e3 if tails comes up three times; and you receive e4 if tails comes up
four times.
The payoﬀ from the four coin tosses will be added to your ﬁxed payment
for ﬁlling in the questionnaire. Please now toss your coin four times (the
ﬁrst four tosses count).
{Face-to-Face: Soon, we will come to your cabin. We will ask you to tell
us the number of coin tosses that came up with tails.}
{Phone: Soon, we will contact you in your cabin via Skype. Therefore,
please put on your head-set. We will ask you to tell us the number of
coin tosses that came up with tails.}
{PC-Lab & PC-Online: Soon, we will be connected via an online-
connection. We will ask you to tell us the number of coin tosses that
came up with tails.}
After you told us the number of coin tosses that came up with tails, the
questionnaire will be shown on your computer screen. Please then ﬁll in
the questionnaire carefully.
{} = Indicate the phrase that is exclusively employed in the respective
treatment, [Face-to-Face], [Phone], [PC-Lab], or [PC-Online].
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Questions for Belief Elicitation in the Questionnaire
These questions relate to the potential behavior of other participants in
the experiment who ﬁnd themselves in the same situation you were in.
What do you think: How many times would 100 randomly selected peo-
ple, who actually tossed tails zero [one, two, three, four ] times, report
tails? Therefore, please allocate these 100 people to the following ﬁve
possible answers:
[_] report tails 0 times.
[_] report tails 1 times.
[_] report tails 2 times.
[_] report tails 3 times.
[_] report tails 4 times.
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5 Fraud at the Kiosk - Field
Evidence from Buying
Candy
5.1 Introduction
The question of how markets aﬀect individual morality has been debated
ever since economics emerge as a scientiﬁc ﬁeld (Smith, 2010; Sandel,
2012, 2013, and Falk and Szech, 2013, for recent experimental ﬁndings).
What has not been thoroughly debated is the fact that certain mar-
ket characteristics inﬂate the risk of moral failures. One example of
this can be found in credence goods markets, in which informational
asymmetries exist between sellers and buyers. In such credence goods
markets, customers typically face the risk of being either overcharged
or overtreated. Credence goods have most prominently been discussed
in the realms of automobile repair or medical services, where customers
usually suﬀer from inferior knowledge compared to expert sellers. As
customers simply do not know what they need nor cannot ﬁnd out due
to their lack of expertise, expert sellers can either charge them more
than is justiﬁed or sell them more than is needed. More recently, the
discussion was extended towards professional services, such as computer
programming, where the risks seem severe due to rather extreme knowl-
edge diﬀerences and high costs of changing the supplier. Darby and Karni
(1973) were the ﬁrst to use the term credence good. They systematically
explored the behavior of customers and sellers in credence goods markets
and examined possible market equilibria. Subsequent theory (e.g., Dul-
leck and Kerschbamer, 2006) and experiments (e.g., Dulleck et al., 2011;
Balafoutas et al., 2013) highlight the particular risks for customers, which
typically involve two above mentioned distinctive threats: overcharging
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and overtreatment (see also Domenighetti et al., 1993; Wolinsky, 1993;
Schneider, 2012).
The present research addresses an important gap in the literature re-
garding fraudulent behavior in such credence goods markets. While typi-
cally behavior in these markets cannot clearly be attributed to overcharg-
ing or overtreatment, we examine a product that - by strict deﬁnition -
does not qualify as a credence good, but shares essential characteristics
that permit overcharging while precluding overtreatment. Additionally,
we are able to address the stability of seller behavior across customer en-
counters and analyze discrimination against particular customers (which
we vary in terms of status and purchase size) in two ﬁeld experiments.
The motivation is closely tied to recent experimental evidence showing
that professionals in credence goods industries are much more prone to
overtreat compared to naive student samples in a laboratory experiment.
Beck et al. (2014) ﬁnd that  possibly due to decision heuristics  car me-
chanics in a laboratory setting systematically overtreat customers more
than students. Therefore, they suggest that overtreatment is "learned",
possibly as a result of certain institutional rules (e.g., high warranties or
high legal risks of undertreatment). To complement this research, we in-
vestigate if certain sellers still systematically overcharge once controlled
for overtreatment. We therefore rely on a (non credence good) market
that rules out overtreatment and reduces the risk to overcharging faced
by customers, while maintaining a setting that one could label "quasi-
credence good". To achieve this, we exploit the existence of candy-by-
weight pricing schemes frequently used in kiosks in Cologne (Germany)
as it allows a panel to be set up in the ﬁeld to address seller behavior in
a repeated setting. Importantly, loose candy is often weighed on an un-
observable scale by sellers. If at all, buyers can only check on a personal
scale at home directly after the purchase whether they have been charged
the correct amount, which gives candy sales a credence good attribute,
as it invites overcharging due to informational asymmetry regarding the
true weight of the candy.
In this setting, we are able to address two important aspects relevant
to credence goods markets. First, we investigate the generalizability of
standard results, namely whether customers are overcharged at all. To
do this, we contrast the behavior of sellers relying on hidden scales to
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sellers using openly visible scales (an alternative used in some stores;
Experiment 1). Subsequently, making repeated purchases within one
hour in the same kiosk with a hidden scale (Experiment 2), we evaluate
how robustly sellers overcharge their customers, thereby addressing an
important aspect of such markets that - to our knowledge - has not yet
been analyzed. We rely on a ﬁeld experiment to boost external validity
of our results and to measure subjects behavior in a naturally occurring
environment without their awareness of being monitored (see Beck et al.,
2014, and List, 2006, for the general advantages of ﬁeld experiments).
We generally replicate previous results (Experiment 1) and  impor-
tantly  ﬁnd support for the conclusion that a characterization of sellers
is possible, which further indicates some level of behavioral consistency
by sellers across purchases (Experiment 2), as well as their discrimina-
tion against particular high status buyers that purchase large quantities.
In total, our ﬁeld experiments yield three core ﬁndings: First, consis-
tent with the literature, overcharging only occurs in kiosk with hidden
scales where customers can be secretly overcharged. Thus, we ﬁnd that
overcharging occurs once overtreatment is ruled out and therefore other
explanations have limited applicability (i.e., fear of warranties or best-
intentions). In these kiosks, customers were overcharged in 40 (Exper-
iment 1) to 44 (Experiment 2) percent, compared to below 10 percent
in kiosks using scales visible to the public. Second, the occurrence of
overcharging partly depends on contextual variations, e.g., the amount
of candy purchased or the physical appearance of the customer as a repre-
sentative of a high status group (see theories on distributional preference
from Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, and Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). Third,
the data suggest that many sellers could be classiﬁed as either honest or
cheaters. We ﬁnd that sellers to a certain degree behave consistently in
the repeated purchases, i.e., we were able to classify a majority of sell-
ers as members of a particular category, e.g., being either consistently
accurate or fraudulent.
5.2 A Brief Description of Kiosks
As many readers may be unfamiliar with the nature of the kiosks used in
the experiments, we brieﬂy describe the market structure of such kiosks.
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Quite common in Cologne's urban landscape, kiosks (Büdchen in the
local language) are small-sized shops for newspapers, magazines, bever-
ages, and a small range of groceries. Their existence stems from the fact
that grocery stores' opening hours used to be heavily regulated in Ger-
many. For people interested in buying newspapers, cigarettes, or drinks
outside of general service hours (often 8 a.m. - 6:30 p.m.), kiosks were
the only option.
Despite some deregulation of opening hours in the past decade, kiosks
have survived and are a vital part of the city's shopping scene. Typi-
cal markets are smaller than 20 square meters and are often owner- or
family-operated, many of them by ﬁrst or second generation immigrants
to Germany. For the present experiments, we relied on markets around
the city center and some popular residential areas directly adjacent to
the city center (see Figure A5.1 in the appendix for a map). As our
good of interest, we use assorted candy that is oﬀered in a plethora of
stores. Paying for candy follows one of two general pricing schemes. Ei-
ther candy is counted and paid for by the item (e.g., 5 cents for small
pieces, 10 cents for larger pieces) or candy is weighed and charged per
100 grams (i.e., most markets charge e1 per 100 grams). We focus our
study on the latter pricing scheme.
When buying candy in this type of kiosks, customers can choose be-
tween several pieces of candy and put them in a little paper bag on their
own. Once they ﬁnish their candy selection, customers hand over the
bag to the seller, who weighs the candy to determine the price. In Ex-
periment 1, we exploit the fact that in some markets the scale is clearly
visible from the customer's perspective, while in some it is not.
One important characteristic of our setting is that it does not allow
for best intentions as an excuse for fraud (e.g., avoidance of warranties
or overtreatment with best intentions). As discussed by Balafoutas et al.
(2013), generous overtreatment with best intentions can be prematurely
interpreted as fraud. For example, a taxi driver might be accused of ille-
gitimate detours while in fact having best intentions to take a longer, but
faster route. Similarly, a car mechanic (or physician) might be overly cau-
tious by conducting unnecessary actions with the best intention of pro-
longing the lifetime of a car (patient) or ruling out the risk that a problem
occurs again soon. Therefore, the candy-by-weight pricing scheme pro-
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vides a natural setting to address the question of overcharging in the
ﬁeld while ruling out overtreatment due to best intentions, a frequent
confounding factor of fraudulent behavior in credence goods markets.
5.3 Experiment 1: Overcharging When
Selling Candy
Experiment 1 was designed to test the basic assertion that candy sales
are prone to overcharging. It employs a quasi-experimental ﬁeld setup
in the city of Cologne. The peculiarity we exploit in Experiment 1 is the
position of the scale in kiosks used to weigh candy. In 37 of 82 visited
markets, the location of the scale is publicly visible and the outcome
of the weighing is observable to customers.1 Henceforth, this situation
is denoted as Public Scale. In the remaining 45 markets, the outcome
of the scale cannot be observed by the buyer. In this case, the buyer
cannot (immediately) verify whether the calculated amount matches the
real weight or not. Hence, the seller can easily overcharge the buyer.2
In the following, this situation is denoted as Hidden Scale. The logical
hypothesis is that the risk of being overcharged is higher in markets
where the sellers of candy weighs with hidden scales compared to those
weighing with public scales.
5.3.1 Procedure
In each of 82 markets, the same male buyer entered the market and col-
lected about 150 grams of candy (i.e., roughly 15 similar pieces). The
bag was then handed over to the seller, who weighed it on a digital scale
to determine the price. The price was paid by the buyer, after which
he left the kiosk. Interaction and appearance was held neutral and con-
1With the help of research assistants, we scanned the entire city center and adjacent
residential areas for kiosks using the pay-per-weight pricing scheme. The sample
consists of all identiﬁed markets that use this pricing scheme as of November
2011. After this initial scan we predetermined routes of visits that were used to
gather data for the experiment. All purchases followed predetermined routes and
protocols to minimize unobservable confounding factors.
2Note that overtreatment and undertreatment is also not possible in our setting since
the buyer chooses the candy by himself.
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stant during all purchases.3 The purchases followed a predeﬁned route,
and after leaving the buyer marked the bag with a sticker that uniquely
identiﬁed the market and the price. Furthermore, 30 minutes after the
purchase, two student assistants conducted a questionnaire asking sellers
for demographics and personality traits (see Rammstedt and John, 2007).
The relationship between the candy sales and the questionnaire was not
disclosed to sellers.4 After the purchases, the candy-bags were weighed
again and the diﬀerence between price paid and the correct price was cal-
culated to render the key variable of the experiment. All purchases took
place on weekdays (Tuesdays-Thursdays) evenings of November 2011.
5.3.2 Results and Discussion
In the following, the diﬀerence between the price paid and the actual price
is denoted as 4i which can either be positive, i.e., the customer is over-
charged, or negative, i.e., the customer is undercharged (i = 1, ..., 82). In
case 4i takes the value of zero the charged price is correct. Consistent
with our initial hypothesis, we ﬁnd our product to be more expensive in
Hidden Scale. On average, the charged price is 1.69 cents above the cor-
rect price in Hidden Scale and -4 cents below the correct price in Public
Scale. This diﬀerence turns out to be signiﬁcant (p=0.019; Fisher-Pitman
permutation test, one-sided). The average size of overcharging (condi-
tional on overcharging) is 12 cents in Hidden Scale and 5 cents in Public
Scale. The average size of undercharging (conditional on undercharging)
is 9 cents in markets using an public scale and 6 cents in markets em-
ploying a hidden scale (see also Tables A5.2 and A5.3 in the appendix
for more detailed descriptive statistics).
In the following, the occurrence of honesty, overcharging, and under-
charging is analyzed. Table 5.1 summarizes the results. There are diﬀer-
ences between markets in the probability of being overcharged. In Public
Scale, 3 out of 37 sellers (8%) overcharge the customer. In contrast,
in Hidden Scale, 18 out of 45 sellers (40%) overcharge. This diﬀerence
3In fact, the customer just said hello when entering the kiosk, that's it when
giving the candy bag to the seller, and goodbye when leaving.
4The student assistants asked the seller to participate in a survey that aims to assess
the situation of kiosks in Cologne. 10 of 37 sellers (27%) using open scales and
27 of the 45 (60%) sellers employing hidden scales ﬁlled in the survey. See Table
A5.1 in the appendix for the results of questionnaire.
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Table 5.1: Overview of results from Experiment 1
Treatment n 4i(means) % honest % overcharging % undercharging
Hidden Scale 45 1.69 9% 40% 51%
∨∗∗ ∧+++ ∨+++ ∨
Public Scale 37 -4 43% 8% 49%
Notes: 4i denotes the diﬀerence between the price paid and the actual price. Stars display the
signiﬁcance of a one-sided Fisher-Pitman permutation test (∗=10 %-level, ∗∗=5 %-level, ∗∗∗=1
%-level). Plus and minus signs display the signiﬁcance of a one-sided χ2-test (−(+)=10 %-level,
−−(++)=5 %-level, −−−(+++)=1 %-level).
is highly signiﬁcant (p<0.01, χ2-tests, one-sided). Thus, we ﬁnd more
sellers to be honest in kiosks employing public scales.
Next, we analyze the frequency of undercharging. In kiosks employing
a Hidden Scale, 23 out of 45 sellers (51%) are generous. In kiosks using
a Public Scale, 18 out of 37 sellers (49%) undercharge their customers.
This diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant.
Finally, 37 of the 82 sellers ﬁlled in the post-experimental questionnaire
(27 in Hidden Scale and 10 sellers in Public Scale). Comparing the data
of sellers in kiosks with hidden scales with sellers with public scales,
we do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences with respect to demographics and
personality traits (see Table A5.1 in the appendix).5 Interestingly, the
price charged by sellers who ﬁll in the questionnaire is on average 2.05
cents above the correct price and -3.28 cents below the correct price in
case sellers denied ﬁlling it in (p=0.029, Fisher-Pitman permutation test,
one-sided).6
Summarizing, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences in overcharging between
kiosks with Hidden Scale and Public Scale. By contrast, there were no ob-
servable diﬀerences in undercharging. Our results replicate previous ex-
perimental evidence that some degree of dishonest behavior (e.g., fraudu-
lent overcharging) can occur in the candy market. Therefore, Experiment
1 contributes to the generalizability of the typical result, which high-
lights the risk of being overcharged in credence goods markets. Moreover,
5In Table A5.4 in the appendix, 4 is regressed on seller demographics and character
traits leading to no signiﬁcant eﬀects.
6A possible explanation for this eﬀect could be that sellers who defrauded their
customers when selling candy clean their bad conscience by ﬁlling the question-
naire (e.g., see Monin and Miller, 2001, on moral licensing, and Gneezy et al.,
forthcoming, on conscience accounting).
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ﬁndings in Experiment 1 allow us to use the candy-paradigm to examine
behavioral consistency and discrimination against particular buyers in
Experiment 2.
5.4 Experiment 2: Behavioral Consistency
of Sellers and Discrimination of Buyers
While Experiment 1 was designed to test the basic assertion that kiosks
selling candy can qualify as an example of overcharging, Experiment 2
was designed to test the main research question regarding the behavioral
consistency of sellers in such kiosks, along with potential discrimina-
tion against particular buyers. Therefore, we designed an experiment
informed by previous research (Ebeling et al., 2012; Balafoutas et al.,
2013) and counterbalanced two aspects in a total of four consecutive
purchases in kiosks with hidden scales. First, we manipulated the ap-
pearance of the buyer, making him appear either rich or poor. The
seller's perception of the customer's income was implemented by diﬀer-
ent apparel. Customers (all males) intended to be perceived as having
a high income and were dressed in a suit with a tie and were equipped
with a briefcase, while low-income customers were dressed shabbily and
unshaved and carried a backpack. We implemented this manipulation to
test whether seller behavior might be driven by distributional preferences
(e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Kerschbamer
et al., 2009). Additionally, we varied the amount of candy bought, ei-
ther a large amount of candy, i.e., 150 grams, or small amount, i.e., 50
grams, to vary the probability by which fraud could be detected by the
customer.7 Hence, in Experiment 2 we implemented a 2x2 experimental
design with four treatments, i.e., Rich-Large, Rich-Small, Poor-Large,
and Poor-Small. Table 5.2 summarizes the experimental treatments of
7Whether this was indeed the case was tested in an independent laboratory ex-
periment. We asked 64 participants to give us their weight-estimates of a 50
grams (n=32) vs. a 150 grams (n=32) bag of candy. Estimations were incentive-
compatible. The results suggest that estimates of the large bag are more inaccu-
rate than estimates of a small bag, i.e., standard deviations are larger estimating
the larger bag (SD=106.18 grams) compared to the small bag (SD=29.39 grams;
p<0.01, variance ratio test). Therefore, it can be assumed that it is less risky for
sellers to add a price-premium on a large compared to small a bag of candy. See
also Table A5.5 in the appendix.
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Table 5.2: Treatments of Experiment 2
Treatment Variation of customer's appearance and amount of candy
Rich-Large High income customer buys large amount (150 grams)
Rich-Small High income customer buys small amount (50 grams)
Poor-Large Low income customer buys large amount (150 grams)
Poor-Small Low income customer buys small amount (50 grams)
Note: The experimental treatments are implemented in each kiosk with hidden scale (n=50) through
four consecutive purchases.
Experiment 2.
Again, talking was held neutral and constant over all purchases. We
visited 50 kiosks that rely on hidden scales.8 Our design was exploratory
in the sense that good theoretical arguments exist to justify predictions
that either highlight the intrapersonal stability of fraudulent behavior
or the situational aspect of the income-perception or amount bought
(e.g., Balafoutas et al., 2013). By varying the amounts bought and the
physical appearance of the buyer, we designed a small panel that assigns
four observations to each seller, therefore allowing a test of the behavioral
consistency of sellers over time.
5.4.1 Procedure
Each kiosk was visited by four diﬀerent buyers within one hour on an
evening in late November 2011.9 Between each sale, 15 minute-breaks
ensured that no suspicion was raised by sellers about repeated sales of
largely identical candy bags. Similar to Experiment 1, the buyers entered
the kiosk and collected either 50 or 150 grams of candy (i.e., roughly 5
or 15 pieces).
5.4.2 Results and Discussion
Experiment 2 addresses the robustness of the results by implementing a
panel in the ﬁeld while also varying perceptions of income and amounts
of candy bought. Table 5.3 displays the mean of all 4i and summarizes
8We were able to identify 5 additional kiosks between Experiment 1 and 2 that were
previously missed in scanning the city for kiosks.
9Each buyer kept his role during the entire experiment, e.g., the same buyer in the
rich condition always bought a large amount of candy.
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Table 5.3: Overview of results from Experiments 1 and 2
Treatment n 4i(means) % honest % overcharging % undercharging
Exp. 1: Hidden Scale 45 1.69 9% 40% 51%
Exp. 1: Public Scale 37 -4 43% 8% 49%
Exp. 2: Rich-Large 50 1.42 10% 44% 46%
Exp. 2: Rich-Small 50 -0.36 8% 32% 60%
Exp. 2: Poor-Large 50 -0.1 20% 38% 42%
Exp. 2: Poor-Small 50 1.02 16% 38% 46%
Notes: 4i denotes the diﬀerence between the price paid and the actual price. In Experiment 2 scales
were always hidden. Rich and poor denotes the appearance of the buyer. Large and small speciﬁes
the quantity of candy bought.
the frequencies of honesty, over-, and undercharging.10 Pairwise compar-
isons of the mean 4i between the treatments of Experiment 2 show no
signiﬁcant diﬀerences. As shown in Table 5.3, the largest mean of 4i
can be observed in treatment Rich-Large. Also most overcharging took
place in situations where the buyer appears to be rich and purchases a
large amount of candy. However, frequencies of honesty, overcharging,
and undercharging are not statistically diﬀerent between the treatments
in Experiment 2.11
Table 5.4 shows a series of linear regression models that include dummy
variables for the treatments in Experiment 2. In models (1)-(3), the de-
10The average size of overcharging (conditional on overcharging) is 10 cents in Rich-
Large, 6 cents in Rich-Small, 5 cents in Poor-Large, and 6 cents in Poor-Small (see
also Table A5.2 in the appendix). The average size of undercharging (conditional
on undercharging) is 5 cents in Rich-Large, 4 cents in Rich-Small, 5 cents in Poor-
Large, and 3 cents in Poor-Small (see also Table A5.3 in the appendix).
11Pairwise comparisons of 4i in the Public Scale treatment with the 4i of the treat-
ments in Experiment 2 reveal that the diﬀerences between the prices paid and
the actual prices in all treatments of Experiment 2 (except treatment Rich-Small)
are signiﬁcantly larger (all p-values<0.03, one-sided Fisher-Pitman permutation
test). Pairwise comparisons of the frequencies of honesty and overcharging between
Public Scale and the treatments of Experiment 2 all reveal signiﬁcant diﬀerences
(all p-values<0.05, one-sided χ2-tests), i.e., more overcharging and less honesty is
observed in all treatments of Experiment 2 compared to the Public Scale treat-
ment in Experiment 1. The frequencies of undercharging are not diﬀerent between
treatment Public Scale and the treatments of Experiment 2. See Table A5.6 in
the appendix.
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Table 5.4: OLS regressions on 4i for Experiments 1 and 2
Dependent Variable: Size of 4i Size of overcharging
(conditional on overcharging)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Rich-Large 0.400 0.400 4.030
(1.846) (1.839) (2.796)
Rich-Small -1.380* -1.38 0.003
(0.726) (0.723) (1.361)
Poor-Large -1.120 -1.120 -1.316
(0.928) (0.926) (1.485)
Public Scale -5.013***
(1.805)
Status (1 if rich) -1.380* 0.003
(0.726) (1.361)
Quantity (1 if large) -1.120 -1.316
(0.928) (1.485)
Interaction: Status×Quantity 2.900 5.343*
(2.008) (2.914)
Gender (1 if female) -0.217 -0.217 0.390 -1.714 -1.714
(1.956) (1.956) (1.743) (2.823) (2.823)
Constant 1.042 1.042 1.02 6.444*** 6.444***
(0.772) (0.772) (0.746) (0.999) (0.999)
Observations 200 200 237 76 76
R-squared 0.008 0.008 0.042 0.083 0.083
Notes: OLS-regression coeﬃcients (robust standard errors clustered on kiosk-level in parenthe-
ses), reference group: Poor-Small . Rich-Large, Rich-Poor, Poor-Large, and Public Scale represent
dummy variables for the respective treatments. Signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level is
denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
pendent variable is 4i, and it can be shown that the treatment dummies
of Experiment 2 have almost no eﬀect on 4i (except for treatment Rich-
Small). In model (3), a dummy variable for treatment Public Scale is
included, which has a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on 4i. In models (4)-
(5), the dependent variable is the size of overcharging conditional on
overcharging. In these models, the treatment dummies from Experiment
2 also have no signiﬁcant eﬀect.
As can be seen in Table 5.4, we ﬁnd no strong isolated eﬀects of either
the visual status appearance or the quantity of candy bought, whereas the
interaction of the two variables is weakly signiﬁcant (model 5), suggesting
that sellers charge buyers more if they have a high status and purchase
large quantities. All models include clustered standard errors on the
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Table 5.5: Classiﬁcation of predominant seller types
Type Proportion
Honest Type 48% (0%)
Liar Type 16% (26%)
Generous Type 4% (38%)
Not classiﬁable 32% (36% )
Note: Numbers in brackets shows the classiﬁcation of seller types employing the less conservative
deﬁnitions of over- and undercharging.
kiosk-level, based on the fact that each seller has made several sales.
Thus, when buying large amounts, customers in the high income role are
more often overcharged than customers in low income role.
Next, we analyze the robustness of seller behavior in kiosks with hidden
scales in Experiment 2. The four repeated purchases enable measurement
of behavioral consistency by sellers. To achieve this, we relied on the
following conservative protocol. We deﬁne three types of sellers, i.e., the
predominantly honest, liar, and generous type. A seller is classiﬁed as
predominantly honest (liar, generous) type if he behaves at least in three
of the four sales honestly (fraudulently, generously). Honest (fraudulent,
generous) is deﬁned such that in three of the four sales the charged price
must fall within the target range, i.e., derivations of less of than 5 cents
lead to being categorized as honest, deviations greater than +4 lead to
a categorization as fraudulent, deviations smaller than -4 cents lead to a
categorization as generous.12
As Table 5.5 reveals, 68% of the sellers can be classiﬁed as one of the
three types. 48% of the sellers behave consistently honest. 16% of the
sellers systematically defraud their customers, and 4% of the sellers can
be classiﬁed as consistently generous. Hence, it can be assumed that the
sellers who cannot be classiﬁed (32%) somehow react to the treatment
variations in Experiment 2.
The numbers in brackets in Table 5.5 show the type classiﬁcation when
employing a less conservative type deﬁnition, i.e., a seller is classiﬁed as
honest (fraudulent, generous) if at least in three of the four sales the
charged price is correct (is too large, is too small). In this case, 26%
12We deﬁne overcharging (undercharging) this way because cent-prices are often
rounded up or down to an amount that ends at a ﬁve cents point. The method
follows protocols similar to "Swedish Rounding", where the price is rounded to
the a speciﬁc coin, e.g., the ﬁve cents coin. Hence, we gave all sellers the beneﬁt
of the doubt that they did not utilize coins smaller than 5 cents.
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of the sellers can be classiﬁed as liar types and 38% as generous types.
However, none of the sellers can be classiﬁed as an honest type, which
suggests that rounding seems to be prevalent to some extent. There-
fore, we employed the above mentioned more conservative deﬁnition of
overcharging (undercharging) for the complete analysis which is deﬁned
by demanding at least ﬁve cents above (below) the actual price from
the customer, i.e., only if the price paid is more than four cents above
(below) the correct price a customer is  according to this deﬁnition 
overcharged (undercharged). By employing this deﬁnition, the results
remain robust (see numbers in brackets Table A5.6 in the appendix for
an application of this deﬁnition).
5.5 General Discussion
The present research addressed the occurrence and behavioral consis-
tency of overcharging in a market that shares similar characteristics with
a credence goods market, but rules out overtreatment. Additionally, the
research explored discrimination against particular buyers in such mar-
kets. Drawing on the results from two ﬁeld experiments, we replicate the
core result of credence good research that customers are harmed when
informational asymmetries permit sellers to do this. We ﬁnd that when
market characteristics invite overcharging customers face a risk of paying
too much, a risk that is virtually eliminated when the markets do not
have this credence good attribute. Importantly, overcharging cannot be
mistaken for potentially prosocial overtreatment due to best intentions.
In our context, overcharging is either erroneous or malicious (although we
carefully allow rounding to see how robust overcharging is). In addition,
we ﬁnd that high status customers who purchase large quantities are par-
ticularly prone to being overcharged. This highlights some discrimination
against people who might be able to aﬀord a small "price-premium", es-
pecially when the likelihood of being detected is small. Furthermore,
many sellers behave quite consistently across sales, delivering ﬁrst exper-
imental evidence for the question of behavioral consistency. Interestingly,
the majority of sellers can be classiﬁed as honest type. Drawing on our
research, it seems that certain bad apples spoil the barrel. While lay-
wisdom might quip, for instance, that "all car mechanics are frauds", our
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data suggest that only a minority of expert sellers cheats, although quite
systematically.
Therefore, our results map into the existing literature highlighting the
risks for customers that are also found in credence goods markets. Sev-
eral theoretical and empirical analyzes have highlighted the occurrence
of fraudulent behavior in markets for credence goods (see, Darby and
Karni, 1973; Dulleck et al., 2011). Building on previous research (e.g.,
Balafoutas et al., 2013), we show the negative eﬀects of these market
characteristics for customers, but we are also able to show in a real-world
market setting that only a small proportion of sellers systematically over-
charge their customers when they have an easy possibility to defraud, i.e.,
customers cannot see the display of a scale on which candy is weighed
to determine the price. Although the proﬁts from fraud are quite small,
more than 15% of sellers systematically betray their customers, yielding
a small, but steady proﬁt. While some research emphasizes institutional
reasons as a driver of overtreatment bias (e.g., Beck et al., 2014), over-
charging could likely be addressed in an easier way. Our context shows
that transparency of prices completely mitigates the risk for customers.
In the case of openly visible scales, overcharging is negligible.
With our method of buying from the same individuals repeatedly, we
can answer some questions regarding behavioral types. However, our
quasi-experimental design in Experiment 1 lacks one key feature in ﬁeld
experiments - randomization (see, Harrison and List, 2004). However,
we only utilize Experiment 1 to show that overcharging occurs in kiosks,
while our main research question addressing behavioral consistency and
discrimination against high status persons is solely addressed in Exper-
iment 2. To address the lack of randomization, we can show that both
populations with public and hidden scale, respectively, do not system-
atically diﬀer regarding demographics and other personality traits. An-
other potential shortcoming is that the ﬁnancial consequences for people
involved are rather low. However, we can deliver an insight into a real
market and show that fraudulent as well as generous behavior might oc-
cur. This ﬁnding might be transferable to other markets with higher
ﬁnancial stakes.
Further experimental research is needed to better understand behav-
ioral patterns across time in other markets for credence goods. It would
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be particularly interesting to address the stability of overcharging in pro-
fessional services ﬁrms that sell services that are highly prone to fraud
and highly sensitive, e.g., programming or data-services. In fact, trust-
worthiness of professional services ﬁrms is a key issue that becomes more
important the more sensitive the market becomes. Therefore, economists
need to gather detailed knowledge about the exact mechanisms that cer-
tain institutional details impose on market outcomes.
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5.6 Appendix
Figure A5.1: Map of kiosks
Note: Bright kiosks use hidden scale, whereas dark kiosks apply public scales.
Table A5.1: Overview of sellers' demographics and personality traits
Question on Hidden Scale (n=27) Public Scale (n=10) Diﬀerence
Age 39.2 37.4 1.8
Gender 75% male 83% male -8%
Foreign 71% 91% -20%
Openness 2.82 2.5 0.32
Conscientiousness 2.28 2.33 -0.05
Extraversion 3.43 3.08 0.35
Agreeableness 1.83 2.08 -0.25
Neuroticism 1.81 1.63 0.18
Note: Participation was not incentivized. Diﬀerences of all personality traits between Hidden Scale
and Public Scale are statistically not diﬀerent (all p-values>0.2, MWU-tests, two-sided). Scale relia-
bilities of the traits are: Openness (Cronbach's α=0.374), Conscientiousness (α=0.439), Extraversion
(α=0.204), Agreeableness (α=0.453), Neuroticism (α=0.372).
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Table A5.2: Amount of overcharging in cents
Treatment n Amount of overcharging % of actual price overcharged n (overcharging)
Exp. 1: Hidden Scale 45 12 (24) 8% (18%) 18 (8)
Exp. 1: Public Scale 37 5 (9) 4% (6%) 3 (1)
Exp. 2: Rich-Large 50 10 (17) 6% (10%) 22 (12)
Exp. 2: Rich-Small 50 6 (10) 13% (22%) 16 (8)
Exp. 2: Poor-Large 50 5 (11) 3% (7%) 19 (7)
Exp. 2: Poor-Small 50 6 (10) 14% (25%) 19 (9)
Total 282 8 (15) 7% (14%) 97 (45)
Notes: Amounts of overcharging in cents are conditional on overcharging. Numbers in brackets show
the amounts employing the more conservative deﬁnition of overcharging, i.e., overcharging is deﬁned
by demanding at least ﬁve cents above the actual price from the customer.
Table A5.3: Amount of undercharging in cents
Treatment n Amount of undercharging % of actual price undercharged n (undercharging)
Exp. 1: Hidden Scale 45 6 (12) 4% (8%) 23 (9)
Exp. 1: Public Scale 37 9 (17) 5% (9%) 18 (8)
Exp. 2: Rich-Large 50 5 (8) 3% (5%) 22 (9)
Exp. 2: Rich-Small 50 4 (8) 9% (18%) 30 (9)
Exp. 2: Poor-Large 50 5 (8) 3% (5%) 21 (10)
Exp. 2: Poor-Small 50 3 (6) 7% (14%) 23 (5)
Total 282 5 (10) 4% (8%) 137 (50)
Notes: Amounts of undercharging in cents are conditional on undercharging. Numbers in brackets
show the amounts employing the more conservative deﬁnition of undercharging, i.e., undercharging
is deﬁned by demanding at least ﬁve cents below the actual price from the customer.
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Table A5.4: OLS regressions for Experiment 1
Dependent Variable: Size of 4i
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Hidden Scale 5.689** 5.491** 3.436 1.327
(2.675) (2.552) (3.954) (3.945)
Gender (1 if female) 6.604 5.806 5.03
(7.891) (8.784) (8.596)
Age 0.265 0.211
(0.138) (0.159)
Openness 2.029
(1.716)
Conscientiousness -1.078
(2.277)
Extraversion 2.615
(1.897)
Agreeableness 0.548
(2.004)
Neuroticism -1.194
(2.876)
Fill in Survey (1 if yes) 5.343*
(2.764)
Constant -4** -4.535** -11.811* -18.711 -3.289*
(1.644) (1.814) (6.691) (11.686) (2.019)
Observations 82 82 37 37 82
R-squared 0.05 0.074 0.131 0.131 0.044
Notes: OLS-regression coeﬃcients (robust standard errors in parentheses), reference group: Public
Scale. Hidden Scale represents a dummy variable for this treatment. Numbers of observations drop
in model (3) and (4) because of missing values. In model (5), Fill in Survey represents a dummy
variable for sellers' willingness to ﬁll in the questionnaire. Signiﬁcance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent
level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.
Table A5.5: Weight estimation of candy bags in laboratory
Weight of candy bag n Estimation (mean in grams) Standard deviation
50 grams 32 75.38 29.39
150 grams 32 218.41 64.78
Note: Accuracy of estimation was incentivized.
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Table A5.6: Results from Experiments 1 and 2
Treatment
n Mean 4i
% % %
honest overcharging undercharging
Exp. 1: Hidden Scale 45 1.69 (1.84) 9% (60%) 40% (18%) 51% (20%)
∨∗∗(∗∗) ∧+++(+++) ∨+++(++) ∨
Exp. 1: Public Scale 37 -4 (-3.41) 43% (78%) 8% (3%) 49% (22%)
Exp. 2: Rich-Large 50 1.42 (1.6) 10% (58%) 44% (24%) 46% (20%)
∨∗∗(∗∗) ∧+++(+++) ∨+++(+++) ∧
Exp. 1: Public Scale 37 -4 (-3.41) 43% (78%) 8% (3%) 49% (22%)
∧∗∗(∗∗) ∨+++(+++) ∧+++(++) ∧
Exp. 2: Rich-Small 50 -0.36 (0.24) 8% (66%) 32% (16%) 60% (18%)
Exp. 2: Poor-Large 50 -0.1 (-0.06) 20% (66%) 38% (14%) 42% (20%)
∨∗∗(∗∗) ∧++(++) ∨+++(++) ∧
Exp. 1: Public Scale 37 -4 (-3.41) 43% (78%) 8% (3%) 49% (22%)
∧∗∗∗(∗∗∗) ∨+++(+++) ∧+++(++) ∨
Exp. 2: Poor-Small 50 1.02 (1.24) 16% (72%) 38% (18%) 46% (10%)
Notes: 4 denotes the diﬀerence between the price paid and the actual price. In Experiment 2 scales
were always hidden. Rich and poor denotes the appearance of the buyer. Large and small speciﬁes
the quantity of candy bought. n stands for the number of observations. Stars display the signiﬁcance
of a one-sided Fisher-Pitman permutation test (∗=10 %-level, ∗∗=5 %-level, ∗∗∗=1 %-level). Plus
and minus signs display the signiﬁcance of a one-sided χ2-test (−(+)=10 %-level, −−(++)=5 %-level,
−−−(+++)=1 %-level). Numbers in brackets show the results and levels of signiﬁcance employing the
more conservative deﬁnition of overcharging and undercharging, i.e., overcharging (undercharging)
is deﬁned by demanding at least ﬁve cents above (below) the actual price from the customer.
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